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Settling In
This dissertation concerns military education and examines the ambition of 
military academies and how mechanisms of military education resonate with the 
professional military domain. Four years ago, I began with rather open, perhaps 
naïve questions, such as “What are military leaders?” and “Why do they need 
this particular education?” Unsurprisingly, it soon became apparent that there are 
neither academic, nor other definitions of “officer-like behaviour”, or indeed, a 
predefined military path leading to the ideal military leader. Nevertheless, most 
military academies—almost without exception—aspire to, and believe themselves 
able to, teach this “special something” called character education. It was this 
assumption that I decided to study—a study that started on a particular Sunday 
evening in an uninviting barrack in Breda: 
It is Sunday night in Breda. I just made one of the six bunk-beds. Any professional 
soldier would be ashamed of the result, but I am not a soldier; I am researching 
soldierly life. Tomorrow morning a new batch of 273 recruits will start their 
careers at the Netherlands Defence Academy. The goal, for both them and the 
academy, is that they become officers. My goal is to start understanding what that 
means—“becoming an officer”. I have heard some terms very often; leadership, 
formation, character. There are slogans like: “Wij gaan door waar anderen 
stoppen” (We persevere where others give up). “Je moet het maar kunnen”  
(Do you have what it takes?). And an enormous pile of doctrines. But, because 
I want to find out what all these things actually mean, from tomorrow morning 
onwards, I am “attached” to two platoons of cadets. Within a couple of months, 
I will be borrowing the full battle dress of one of their captains and join them 
on their bivouacs. And, about a year from now, I will be visiting a platoon in 
Afghanistan to learn what it actually means to be a deployed officer, and how this 
connects to military education. But right now, I am in a rather desolated barrack, 
quartered in an empty room, making notes under white TL-lights. (field notes, 
August 9, 2015, Breda) 
The research was conducted within the Dutch military. It focuses on the education 
provided for aspirant infantry officers in the Netherlands, and therefore concerns 
only the initial officer education as taught in Breda, at the Royal Netherlands 
Military Academy (RNLMA). The following sections introduce the research 
objective, questions and methodology. The framework of analysis features a 
combination of the four phases of grounded theory and a research perspective 
focussed on discrepancies, as will be explained later in this introductory chapter. 
Before discussing methodology, it is essential to share some information about the 
broader context and ambitions of military education.
Introduction
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Military Education
The extreme contexts in which soldiers are often expected to operate, and in 
which officers need to lead and command, are characterised by “uncertainty, 
time pressure, [and] possible catastrophic consequences such as killing or death” 
(Arnold, Loughlin, & Walsh, 2016, p. 2). In order to handle these complexities, 
it has often been argued that military leaders need to have social, moral and 
cognitive competencies. For example, the Chief of Defence of the Netherlands 
Armed Forces stated in one of his speeches: 
A military leader leads, and should dare to take the lead, has to know what is 
possible and be willing to take risks. To be able to do that, and to actually take the 
lead, does not come easy. It requires character. Character and formation. Physical 
formation; to operate under extreme circumstances. Academic formation; to be 
able to also take the lead in complex situations, within an innovative organisation. 
But above all, it requires personal formation; to not give up, when things get 
hard. To push boundaries and to deal with complex, often ethical dilemmas. This 
formation takes place at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy. Midshipmen 
and cadets, do not underestimate this formation. It is the key to your success. 
(Generaal Middendorp, 2016, translation by the author)
Giuseppe Caforio (2006) confirms this perspective, and explains that basically 
all military academies have two objectives:
[First] cadets have to be endowed with the necessary expertise . . . [and secondly] 
the anticipatory socialization has to be transformed into a true and professional 
socialization. . . . For this purpose, special procedures are used in order to induce 
strong normative compliance, such as community life, discipline, emphasized 
hierarchical order, rules for public and private behaviour, and a system of 
sanctions. (pp. 255–256)
Accordingly, in order to prepare aspirant officers for the professional military 
domain, at the majority of western military academies, programmes for aspirant 
officers consist of three components (Beard, 2014; Caforio, 2000, 2006; 
Dalenberg, 2017; Franke, 2000; Kennedy & Neilson, 2002; Olsthoorn, 2013). 
The first two components—military and academic training—are supposed to 
provide the necessary expertise. Military training is mostly about acquiring 
(basic) military skills and performing the drills deemed necessary for all 
soldiers. This includes weapon handling, marching and military law, but also 
seemingly more mundane skills such as packing your bags and making your bed. 
Academic training varies between countries, from an accredited master degree, 
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to the teaching of basic academic skills and qualifications (Jansen, Braender, & 
Moelker, 2019). As will become clear in the following, the third component—
personal formation, or character formation—is rather more diffuse in both its 
methods and its objectives. 
 The process of personal formation is also known as “moulding” (Dixon, 1976); 
“personal formation” (Franke, 2000); “personal development” (Dalenberg, 2017, p. 
72); “professional socialization” (Caforio, 2006); or “character education” (Beard, 
2014; Caforio 2000, 2006; Dalenberg, 2017; Franke, 2000; Kennedy & Neilson, 
2002; de Lee, Carrick, & Robinson, 2013; Micewski & Annen, 2005; Olsthoorn, 
2013). However, to actually teach character, personal formation, or “mould” 
a cadet, is no simple process—neither for the prospective officers, nor for the 
academies tasked with teaching them. Even staff members of military academies 
themselves sometimes admit that there is “no clearly articulated ‘learning model’ 
or theory for how to develop leaders of character” (Ruggero, 2001, p. 3). 
 Most military academies claim that character formation is an ongoing process 
that “happens” throughout a military officer’s career. Yet there are implicit and 
explicit rules that can be used to train unity, team spirit and attitude. Methods 
include a hazing period, classes on etiquette and how to behave “as an officer”, 
sports, social activities and initiation rites, comparable to those of civil fraternities, 
but more aligned with military traditions. Students are put through the same 
initiation rites, with the intention to create a sense of unity and cultivate a team 
spirit. Historically, this learning process consisted merely of wearing down and 
building up, at least in the Netherlands (Groen & Klinkert, 2003; Richardson, 2008; 
van Schilt, 2011). Sander Dalenberg (2017) explains the stages of adjustment most 
cadets go through as follows: 
During the first stage, the pre-arrival stage, the new member seeks to obtain 
information about the organisation. Orientation on attitudes, norms and values 
and information seeking are the main activities in stage one. Stage two is the 
actual socialization phase. The new member learns the ins and outs of the new 
organization and has to accept its reality. . . . At that particular time, there is no 
gradual exposure and no real way for the new member to confront the situation 
a little at a time. The newcomer’s senses are simultaneously overwhelmed with 
many unfamiliar cues. . . . There is mutual acceptance between newcomer and 
organization, the newcomer is transformed into an organizational member, or—in 
other words—he or she has learned how to behave and what is more, he or she is 
expected to perform. (p. 46)
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Thus, although many claim the importance of character education for prospective 
military leaders, there are few who can clearly define what it really means, or 
how it works. Moreover, this type of training is far from uncontroversial (Beebe 
& Kaldor, 2010; Blom et al., 2002; Giroux, 2004; Oltshoorn, 2013; Richardson, 
Verweij, & Winslow, 2004; de Lee, Carrick & Robinson 2013; Zimbardo, 2007). 
Rudy Richardson and Ad Vogelaar (2009) explain that in the first few weeks of 
military training, the pressure on the fragile social emotional identity of cadets 
is fierce: 
In the first few weeks the social emotional identity of the aspirant officer is the 
most fragile. Pressure is being put on the cadets, the boarding school system is 
closing in on them, authority and hierarchy are made very explicit and the own 
expectations (from before starting) are often challenged. Things turn out different 
than expected. This often leads to a fragile social emotional identity. (p. 9, 
translation by the author)
In the period I conducted this study in the Dutch military organisation, incidents 
regarding military education—varying from (sexual) intimidation to a feeling 
of unease as a result of peer pressure—made an appearance in the Dutch 
media (e.g., Keultjes, 2018; van Outeren, 2014) and was a topic of study for 
the “Commissie Sociaal Veilige Werkomgeving Defensie” (Commission for 
Safe Working Environment in Defence, 2018). Unfortunately, these incidents 
are nothing new. Over the past 25 years several research commissions have 
been tasked with studying the risks of military education in the Netherlands. In 
2006, as a result of further reported cases of harassment, the Staal Commission 
was tasked to look into some serious incidents. The commission concluded 
that the main causes were “a lack of social leadership in combination with the 
military work and culture” (Staal, 2006). In 2008, it was concluded that the Staal 
Commission had not achieved the desired effect, as there was no significant 
decrease in “undesirable behaviour and harassments” (Blauw, 2010). Therefore, 
once again, an independent external organisation was tasked with a new study, 
which found the causes of undesirable behaviour to be “the educational system 
itself, in society at large, in the personal situation of cadets (for example group 
pressure, or being bored) and in the way the recruits are selected” (Blauw, 2010). 
Yet this pattern—of reported problems and a resultant commission to investigate 
them—repeated itself over and over. More incidents were reported, and more 
commissions were asked to look into the organisation of military education. In 
2014, an independent consultancy firm (Governance and Integrity) published a 
report on the integrity of, and risks associated with, military education. In 2018, as 
a result of reported incidents in Schaarsbergen, the Commission for Safe Working 
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Environment in Defence looked into the defence organisation as a whole. Both 
in their motives and their conclusions, these research commissions stated that 
the disciplinary system of military education is prone to issues of harassment. 
Additionally, military insiders such as the Dutch General Van Wiggen (2014) 
and the American LtCol Doty (Doty & Sowden, 2009) explicitly warn of the 
risk of “malformation” when students train and integrate the “wrong” behaviour 
(Governance & Integrity, 2014; Richardson, 2008; Staal, 2006). Whilst there are 
also many optimistic voices—for example those of Jos van Schilt (2011) and 
Ed Ruggerro (2001), who emphasise the comradery, adventure and hardship of 
living at a military academy as examples of positive formation—these cannot 
disguise the widely shared sense of unease regarding the formative power of 
military education. 
 This sense of unease could be retraced in the conclusions of the internal reports 
mentioned previously. It was also confirmed by studies on military education in 
the Netherlands (Dalenberg, 2017; Richardson, 2008) and abroad (Caforio 2000, 
2006; Doty & Sowden, 2009; Wong, 2003). Additionally, academic analyses of the 
learning process of character education (Beard, 2014; Biesta, 2015; Kristjánsson, 
2013) found a similar tension between its goals and its practice. Whilst carefully 
crafted rhetoric speaks of the need for (and results of) military character education, 
simultaneously, internal military reports and academic literature show that these 
ambitions are not necessarily always achieved (Blauw, 2010; Olsthoorn, 2013; 
Richardson, 2008; Staal, 2006; van Wiggen, 2014). Based on this initial analysis, 
there seems to be a discrepancy between the ideals of character education on the 
one hand, and the practice of military education on the other. It is this apparent 
discrepancy that provides the starting point for this dissertation. 
Objective and Central Research Question
It is specifically not the intention to establish if (and if so, to what extent) military 
education leads to malformation. Instead, this dissertation is about the formative 
mechanisms of military education. The aim is to understand what the process 
of character education entails at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy—
whether this intended character education is actually realised and, if not, what 
the consequences are within the professional military domain. This primary aim 
has been formulated into a three-layered central research question: 
What is the ambition of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy with regard 
to character education; is this formative goal actually achieved or is there a 
difference between ambition and practice; and, if there is a difference between 
ambition and practice, what are the implications for the military professional 
domain?  
Introduction
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The assumption underlying this question is the existence of a discrepancy 
between the ambition and the practice of character education. Therefore, a 
research perspective was developed that specifically focusses on the alleged 
discrepancies within the military community. This research perspective is 
described in more detail in the following section, which further shows how this 
perspective is suitable for studying the military community more generally. 
Research Perspective on Discrepancies
The formative power of military character education seems beyond dispute. 
However, the mechanisms and effects of this educational process are unknown 
to many; they seem somewhat of a “black box” (Fosher, 2013, p. 85, see also 
Latour 2005). In order to study the formative mechanisms of military education, 
a research perspective was developed that specifically focusses on the alleged 
discrepancies within a given community.
 Bronisław Malinowski is considered the founding father of the ethnographic 
method. Central to his method is a focus on discrepancies between “what people 
say they do”, and “what they actually do” (Morris, [1987] 2003, p. 145; see 
also Malinowski, [1922] 2014; O’Reilly, 2011). In Malinowski’s work, “they” 
refers to the people in the communities he studied. “What they say they do” 
refers to the customs, traditions, structures and institutions (O’Reilly, 2011, 
p. 13), whilst “what they do” refers to what the people involved actually “feel 
and think qua members of a given community” (Malinowski, [1922] 2014, p. 
23). Malinowski argued that the “constructive drafting” of these specific parts 
“and the manner in which they integrate” conceptualise a particular society as a 
whole (Malinowski cited in Morris, [1987] 2003, p. 144). Thus, studying only 
the traditions or the laws of a certain society will, if conducted in isolation, not 
provide the knowledge needed to analyse such a society as a whole. Likewise, 
only studying the behaviour of those in a certain society will similarly fail to 
yield a complete picture. Only via the combination and integration of official 
texts and behaviour does it become possible to fully conceptualise a society. 
 Chris Argyris and Donald Schön (1974) apply a similar line of thinking in their 
organisational research. Argyris and Schön coined the terms “espoused theory” 
and “theory in use” in order to describe the difference between “what people say 
they do” and “what people do”. Argyris (1976) explains that “espoused theories 
of action are those that people report as a basis for actions. Theories-in-use are 
the theories of action inferred from how people actually behave” (p. 367). This 
distinction emphasises the tendency of people to claim to operate according to 
a certain set of theories, whilst in fact their behaviour shows incongruence with 
that theory. Argyris and Schön claim that you can deduct a different theory (a 
theory in use) from the behaviour of people. 
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 The main assumption in the work of Malinowski, Argyris and Schön is that 
a focus on discrepancies will reveal more about a society, or particular group. 
It is this idea that forms the basis for the research perspective that is applied in 
this dissertation. Following Malinowski, Argyris and Schön, it is argued that the 
combination of these components, how they integrate and where they diverge, 
is of pivotal importance to “make a constructive drafting” (Malinowski cited in 
Morris, [1987] 2003, p. 144) of the meaning and practice of character education 
in the military. This drafting will clarify what the process of character education 
entails at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy—whether this intended 
character education is actually realised and, if not, what the consequences are 
within the professional military domain.
 For this dissertation, the idea of a focus on discrepancies was used, and 
enriched with an extra component, namely that of “educational philosophy”. This 
component philosophically underpins the term “character education”, which, in 
Malinowski’s terms, can be labelled as “what they say”, as it refers to an external 
meaning of character education. This is shown in Figure 1. 
Discrepancies
What they say What they say they do What they do
Educational Philosophy Institutional Rhetoric Daily practices
Constructive drafting of the meaning and practice of character education in the military
Figure 1: Perspective on discrepancies, based on Malinowski ([1922] 2014) and Argyris and 
Schön (1974).
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Phases of Grounded Theory
The military organisation, and more specifically the RNLMA, can be understood 
as a biotope, with its own sets of (unwritten) rules, norms and traditions defining 
how people should interact. In order to study this biotope, a grounded theory 
approach will help to understand the alleged discrepancies of character education 
at the RNLMA. 
 Grounded theory is particularly apt for the type of questions discussed in 
this dissertation, as it enables meaningful—albeit what might at first glance 
appear mundane—questions to be asked about daily practices, internal logic, 
role models, traditions, the attribution of meaning and sense making, without 
excluding the use of pre-existing literature. Classic grounded theory (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967) is “a set of inductive strategies for analysing data”, aimed at 
“developing more abstract conceptual categories to synthesize, to explain and to 
understand your data and to identify patterned relationships within it” (Charmaz 
& Belgrave, 2007, p. 28). This approach permits inductive research, starting 
from the empirical experience, rather than from an abstract theory. The use of 
grounded theory enables one to stay close to the original data, and as such it 
aims to develop theory from observations. The methodology of grounded theory 
is generally divided into four phases: exploration; specification; reduction; and 
integration (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Study 1 is exploratory in nature, whereas 
Study 2 and 3 specify, and Study 4 reduces by focusing on one discrepancy 
in particular. In the fourth phase—integration—theory development takes place 
(described in the conclusion). Figure 2 depicts the four phases and how they 
relate to the separate studies.
 Beyond classic grounded theory, informed grounded theory (Kempster & 
Parry, 2014; Thornberg, 2012) aims “to identify certain mechanisms (casual 
powers) that may even be unnoticed by the research participants, and can 
be revealed by studying both context and internal relations” (Kempster & 
Parry, 2014, p. 88). For that purpose, informed grounded theory rejects pure 
induction and encourages the use of pre-existing literature and theories in order 
to understand the empirical material at hand and support the analysis of the 
phenomena observed. 
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Exploration Study 1: Philosophical 
exploration of character 
education.
Questions whether a discrepancy exists 
between the ambition and the practice of 
military academies. 
Specification 
RNLMA
Study 2: Empirical 
specification of character 
education.
Studies the discrepancy between the 
institutional rhetoric of the RNLMA and 
the daily practices of cadets.
Specification 
professional 
domain
Study 3: Empirical 
specification of the military 
professional domain.
Analyses the military professional 
domain by specifically focusing on 
the daily practices of a platoon in 
Afghanistan.
Reduction Study 4: Reduction to one 
discrepancy in the military 
organisation.
Zooms in on one particular (typical) 
discrepancy within the military 
organisation, namely the tension 
between complexity and standardisation.
Integration Conclusion dissertation: 
Integrates the phases of 
grounded theory, as well 
as the components of the 
research perspective.
Integrates these components in order to 
achieve the aim of this dissertation. 
Figure 2: Phases of informed grounded theory and aim of studies. 
This theoretical addition makes informed grounded theory particularly apt for 
this dissertation. It can help to make sense of the data collected and to focus, 
not only on the experiences of the Dutch servicemen themselves, but also on the 
stated ambition and its relation to theoretical concepts of character education, 
as performed in the first study. In fact, throughout this dissertation, the use of 
pre-existing literature is of fundamental importance in order to understand the 
alleged discrepancy between the academic definition of character education 
and the military practice of character education. Furthermore, with its focus on 
“certain causal mechanisms” (Kempster & Parry, 2014, p. 88), the use of informed 
grounded theory analyses the process of character education in the institutional 
context of the RNLMA. In combination with this focus on discrepancies, it is 
hoped that this methodology leads to conclusions on military character education 
beyond the superficial. 
Framework of Analysis
Each of the studies in this dissertation examines the alleged discrepancies as laid out 
in the research perspective, either within military education, or in the professional 
military domain and reflects a phase of the informed grounded theory approach 
Introduction
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employed here. The integration and analysis of these examinations will help to 
achieve the research objective, namely to understand what the process of character 
education entails at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy—whether this intended 
character education is actually realised and, if not, what the consequences are within 
the professional military domain. The research perspective, in combination with an 
informed grounded theory approach, forms the framework of analysis that connects 
the four separate studies, as is shown in Figure 3. Underneath each study, its main 
research question and relation to the framework are explained. 
Discrepancies Phases of Informed 
Grounded Theory
Study 1 Educational Philosophy Institutional Rhetoric Exploration
Study 2 Institutional Rhetoric Daily Practices at the 
RNLMA
Specification
Study 3     Institutional Rhetoric     Daily Practices 
in the Military 
Professional Domain
Specification
Study 4 Complexity Standardisation Reduction
Conclusion Educational 
Philosophy
Institutional 
Rhetoric
Daily 
Practices
Integration
Figure 3: Framework of analysis. 
Study 1 questions whether a discrepancy exists between the ambition and the practice 
of character education at military academies. It aims to provide a philosophical 
background to the complex task of character education. The question put forward 
is: What are the philosophical underpinnings of character education, and how does 
this relate to military education? This study can be seen as the exploration phase 
of an informed grounded theory study, as it is a philosophical investigation that 
analyses the philosophical foundations of character education, and the way in which 
character education is translated into learning programmes at military academies. 
This study is used in the integration phase (conclusion) to show the discrepancies 
between educational philosophy and the institutional rhetoric. 
 Study 2 studies the discrepancy between the institutional rhetoric of the RNLMA 
and the daily practices of cadets at the RNLMA. The study takes the form of an 
institutional ethnography (Smith, 1987; Smith et al., 2006) and is centred around 
the question: How do institutional structures and practices of the Royal Netherlands 
Military Academy shape the daily experiences of infantry cadets? In the context 
of the RNLMA, Malinowski’s guidelines can be distilled to the core idea that 
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“What they say they do” is laid down in doctrines, course guides and other textual 
material on military officer education. It describes the customs and traditions of the 
community at the military academy, its structures and institutions. “What they do” 
comes down to actual observed behaviour of the cadets and instructors. In terms of 
grounded theory, this study specifies the discrepancies identified earlier in military 
character education. 
 In study 3 the scope is widened to the professional military domain. It analyses 
this domain by specifically focusing on the daily practices of a Dutch reconnaissance 
platoon deployed in Afghanistan in which leadership broke down and thus became 
subject to question. Set up as a single qualitative case study, this study asks: How 
can we understand military leadership acceptance in an operational setting from a 
social identity perspective? Rather than primarily focusing on the behaviour of the 
leader, this study highlights the perspective of followers in the ranks. In addition to 
its particular focus on leadership acceptance, the study also questions whether the 
discrepancies that were identified previously also exist in the professional military 
domain. In terms of the research perspective, study 3 reflects on the question whether 
the dynamics identified earlier—those that exist within the domain of military 
education—are also present in the military professional domain. 
 Study 4 zooms in on one particular and typical discrepancy within the military 
organisation, namely, the tension between complexity and standardisation. Based 
on extensive fieldwork and theories dealing with uncertainty, the fourth study 
investigates how the contradiction between standardisation and complexity is 
experienced in the context of the Dutch military. This study asks: How can we 
understand the ongoing tension between complexity and standardisation that 
appears in military education as well as in military practice? The study can be 
seen as an analysis of one of the structural challenges of the military organisation 
faced by military leaders. Specifically, by questioning the relation between military 
practice and the military professional domain, this study aims to create a deeper 
understanding of the discrepancy between complexity and standardisation. Within 
the phases of grounded theory, it can be said that this study reduces the findings to 
one discrepancy. 
 The concluding chapter of this dissertation integrates the four studies in two 
ways. First, it serves as the final phase of a grounded theory study—the integration. 
Additionally, it integrates the levels from the research perspective on discrepancies 
with educational philosophy, institutional rhetoric and daily practices. In a 
concluding discussion, the findings are related to questions on structural dynamics 
within military character education. 
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OFFICER BILDUNG
A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF PRECONDITIONS 
FOR MILITARY CHARACTER EDUCATION
Abstract
The importance of military leadership can hardly be underestimated. Military 
organisations worldwide continue to recognise the need for excellent leaders, 
if they are to deal with the complexities of warfare in the best possible way. 
Consequently, for the sake of the organisation, as well as the individual, military 
academies seek to train their recruits to become outstanding leaders. To reach 
this objective, most, if not all, centre their educational programmes around the 
ambition, not only to teach military and academic skills, but also to “develop 
leaders of character.” Subsequently, countless learning programmes and strategies 
aimed at character development exist. However, an initial analysis of contemporary 
military education shows that the practice of character education is far from 
straightforward. This paper examines the philosophical underpinnings of character 
education and in doing so, aims to show the inherent difficulties faced by military 
academies in developing leaders of character. Finally, it argues that, in order to 
understand what it takes to implement military character education, one first needs 
to understand its preconditions. By formulating these preconditions and discussing 
their implications, this paper aims to contribute to the re-evaluation of the dominant 
traditional paradigm in military education.
This chapter has been previously published as: 
Jansen, M. M., & Verweij, D. (2019). Officer Bildung: A philosophical investigation of 
preconditions for military character education. In W. Klinkert, M. Bollen, M. M. Jansen, E. 
H. Kramer & L. Vos (Eds.), Netherlands annual review of military studies 2019. The Hague: 
TMC Asser Press. 
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Introduction
The importance of military leadership can hardly be underestimated. Military 
organisations worldwide continue to recognise the importance of excellent leaders 
if they are to deal effectively with the complexities of modern warfare, including 
the ethical and operational complications emerging from the cultural, socio-
political and psychological characteristics of contemporary missions (van Baarda 
& Verweij 2006; Beard, 2014; Schut & Moelker, 2015; Sherman, 2010). To manage 
these complexities, military organisations—from Hellenistic times through the 
formation of early European nation states to the present day—have underscored 
the importance of character education for military personnel (Caforio, 2000, 2006; 
French, 2003; Olsthoorn, 2013; Richardson, Verweij, & Winslow, 2004; Robinson 
2007). Consequently, most Western military academies offer character education 
in order to support (aspirant) officers learning to navigate the complexities of 
modern warfare (Moelker, 2000). This training is designed with a specific focus on 
leadership qualities (Dalenberg, 2017; Director General Leadership of the Royal 
Military Academy Sandhurst, 2014; Matthews, Eid, Kelly, Bailey, & Peterson, 
2006; Robinson 2007; de Vries 2013). Therefore, most, if not all, Western military 
academies centre their educational programmes around the ambition, not only 
to teach military and academic skills, but also to “develop leaders of character” 
(Canadian Defence Academy, 2005; Director General Leadership of the Royal 
Military Academy Sandhurst, 2014; Nederlandse Defensie Academie, 2016; 
United States Military Academy West Point, 2015).
 In literature, this type of training is referred to as character building, character 
education, or moral education, and in various theoretical contexts, these 
terms are used interchangeably. There is no single shared definition of what 
“character”, “good character”, or “character education” actually refers to, and 
therefore the concept might appear rather ambiguous (van Baarda & Verweij, 
2006; Kristjánsson, 2013). Nevertheless, there is a common understanding in 
mainstream academic discourse that “character education is any form of moral 
education that foregrounds the role of virtuous character in the good life” 
(Kristjánsson, 2013, p. 272). Given its common understanding, this term and its 
associated definition will be used throughout this paper.
 Aside from its semantics, character education itself is a complex process. 
This paper aims to provide a philosophical background to the complex task of 
character education and in doing so, we aim to contribute to the discussion on the 
reassessment of the dominant paradigm in military education and its philosophical 
foundations (Sookermany, 2017). It is argued that, in order to understand what 
it takes to actually put military character education into practice, one needs to 
understand the preconditions for character education. 
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After a brief analysis of current practices of military character education, we re-
asses the philosophical foundations of character education in Aristotelian virtue 
ethics and the tradition of Bildung—an educational tradition focusing on personal 
and intellectual maturation. In both traditions, there is substantial interest in the 
development of character. We discuss these perspectives because we believe they 
have the potential to deliver a substantial contribution to the development of theories 
on military education, and provide the basis of contemporary theories on character 
education (van Baarda & Verweij, 2006; Biesta, 2002, 2016; Dewey, 2007; Good 
& Garrison, 2010; Horlacher, 2015; Løvlie & Standish, 2002; Morgenbesser, 1979; 
Nussbaum, 2012; Sanderse, 2012). Finally, we formulate preconditions for character 
education and discuss their implications for today’s military character education. 
Military Education Analysis
Why Character Education Matters
It is often argued that to adaptively handle the challenges of conflict, officers not 
only need to develop military and intellectual skills, but also moral competencies 
(Beard, 2014; Caforio, 2000, 2006; Deakin, 2008; Doty & Sowden, 2009; 
Kennedy & Neilson, 2002; Micewski & Annen, 2005; Moelker, 2000; Olsthoorn, 
2013; Richardson et al., 2004; Robinson, de Lee, & Carrick, 2008; Visser, 2002). 
Literature supports this widely accepted assertion with two main arguments. The 
first is derived from the just war theory (jus bellum justum)—probably the best 
known ethical framework for military operations.1 For a war to be legitimate, it not 
only needs to have a morally just cause and fulfil several other jus ad bellum (“right 
to war”) criteria; during the war, jus in bello (“right in war”) criteria with regard 
to the actual fighting need to be met as well. In order to evaluate whether a war, 
and the actions taken within a war, are justified, Michael Walzer (2015) argues that 
training morally responsible behaviour is a prerequisite for anyone working within 
an organisation using (armed) power in conflict.
 The second argument highlights the way in which developments in contemporary 
warfare have changed the nature of most military operations and consequently have 
affected the roles and tasks of military leaders. Aside from being a “warrior”, a 
modern soldier needs to be able—depending on the particular assignment—to 
switch adaptively between multiple roles: “The modern soldier is no longer simply 
1 Just war theory is probably best known from the work of Michael Walzer (2015), but dates back 
to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, and is eloquently illustrated by Dyer’s description of the true 
warrior: “[The warrior] does not want to kill people as such, but he will have no objections if it 
occurs in a moral framework that gives him justification—like war” (as cited in Coker, 2007, p. 6). 
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a warrior: he (or she) is at once a peacekeeper, diplomat, leader, sibling and friend” 
(Beard, 2014, p. 274). In the face of such challenges, it has been often endeavoured 
to “incorporate a character-based training programme, designed to develop virtues 
that will assist soldiers in fulfilling the multiple roles” (Beard, 2014, p. 274). To do 
such demanding work and live with the often horrific experience of war, it is argued 
that military personnel have to be both morally and psychologically equipped. 
Shannon E. French (2003) explains that 
moral training in military education is needed because one would never want to see 
them sent off to face the chaotic hell of combat, without something to ground them 
and keep them from crossing over into an inescapable heart of darkness. (p. 11)
French asserts that moral training helps to achieve this: “By setting standards of 
behaviour for themselves, accepting certain restraints, and even honouring their 
enemies, warriors can create a life-line that will allow them to pull themselves 
out of the hell of war and reintegrate themselves into their society” (French, 2003, 
p. 7). Peter Olsthoorn (2013) adds that “incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
shown that the required moderation does not always come naturally” (p. 365). 
This is corroborated by research with regard to the behaviour of military personnel 
in Srebrenica (van Baarda & Verweij, 2006; Blocq, 2006), Abu Ghraib (Giroux, 
2004), the Central African Republic (Carasik, 2015), Somalia (Maogoto, 2000), 
sexual abuse of women and girls by peacekeepers (Ndulo, 2009), and serious 
misconduct by peacekeepers (both civilian and military) operating under a UN 
mandate (Grady, 2016; Odello, 2010). 
 Hence—be it because working in conflict zones requires a firm moral grounding 
because military misconduct should be prevented, or simply because officers need 
a moral compass—Western military academies emphasise character building “to 
assist members of the military in becoming men and women with a strong moral 
commitment” (van Baarda & Verweij, 2006, p. 9). However, although the objective 
of military academies is in most cases neatly defined, to actually “do” character 
education is neither a simple nor a straightforward process.2
2 The United States Military Academy West Point (2015) states as their aim to “[e]ducate, train, and 
inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to 
the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to 
the Nation as an officer in the United States Army” (p. VI). Saint-Cyr, the French military academy, 
is “dedicated to providing cadets not only with basic technical and tactical knowledge, but also with 
behavioral qualities and intellectual skills that will enable young officers to become decision-makers 
and face tomorrow’s challenges” (Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan, 2016, p. 3). Finally, in the United 
Kingdom, “the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) is where all officers in the British Army are 
trained to take on the responsibility of leading their fellow soldiers. During training, all officer cadets 
learn to live by the academy’s motto: ‘Serve to Lead’” (Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2018, n.p.).
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Practices of Military Education
Traditionally, the right to become an officer was confined to the aristocracy. 
Hence, aspirant military officers were assumed to be well-behaved gentlemen, 
hardly in need of any subsequent character education. Teaching novices about 
the nobility of the officer corps was only considered relevant when the rank of 
officer became accessible to people from lower social classes. It was said that 
they lacked the nobility of the “old” officers, and therefore needed a thorough 
education, including lessons in what was considered “officer behaviour” (van 
Schilt, 2011; Schoy, 2011). Notably, this continues to the present day, and is 
being reinforced by military academies via the traditions of their cadet corps. 
For example, during hazing periods, cadets are drilled exhaustively until they 
know how to use the correct titles and exhibit the prescribed manners. However, 
it is debatable whether these “classes” actually constitute character education, 
or are more concerned with socialisation.3 Character education is not solely a 
process of socialisation (e.g., Ashforth, Sluss, & Saks, 2007; Guimond, 1995; 
Rones, 2015), nor is it the result of the powerful influence of a “total” institution 
(Anteby, 2013; Goffman, 1961; Moelker, 2000). Rather, it depends on more than 
formal education alone, and is thus not solely a cognitive issues.
 Another common practice in military education is to anchor its moral 
component in codes of conduct.4 This is done to mark the intention to shape, 
influence and improve the characters of future officers (Deakin, 2008, p. 151; 
Franke, 2000; Franke & Heinecken, 2001). However, the very assumption that 
codes of conduct are a useful vehicle for character education is problematic, as 
character education is “concerned with the development of inner discipline[;] it 
is not something that can be taught by cramming or drilling [and t]here are no 
checklists that can guarantee one becoming a good soldier” (Wortel & Bosch, 
2011, pp. 21–22). Nevertheless, the teaching methods used are, more often than 
not, based on the traditional military educational paradigm, including hierarchical 
instruction methods and a plethora of rules used to regulate behaviour.5 Whilst 
this approach is effective for teaching “a soldier how to load a weapon”, Joe Doty 
and Walter Sowden (2009) argue that it is not the way to develop someone in “the 
moral or ethical arena. You cannot teach someone via PowerPoint to behave in 
the morally correct way” (p. 70). Character education, thus, should be more than 
3 Insightful studies on this topic have been conducted by Dalenberg (2017) and Van Schilt (2011).
4 Although there is no consensus on what the key virtues and values of a good officer are, military 
codes of most Western countries seem to be constructed using (more or less) the same virtues 
(Dalenberg, 2017).
5 Traditional military education is characterised by a “classic modernist view on education rooted in 
universalism, structure and objectivity” (Sookermany, 2017, p. 310; see also Doty & Sowden, 2009; 
Paile, 2014).
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simply listing codes and teaching rules; it is about internalisation, rather than 
memorising.
 A third problem with military character education programmes is that the 
basic philosophical principles underlying them are “often very different from 
one nation to another and developed on an ad-hoc base rather than drawn from 
any systematically considered ethical theory or embedded within any pragmatic 
workable education programme” (Robinson et al., 2008, p. 1). This statement 
is supported by an apparent academic disagreement on what military virtues 
actually are. Peter Olsthoorn (2013) lists honour, courage, loyalty, integrity and 
respect as the five key military virtues, and argues that these virtues are rooted 
in (Aristotelian) virtue ethics. Nancy Snow (2009) thinks that military virtues 
are based on utilitarianism, Kantianism and Enlightenment ideals. Meanwhile, 
Stephen Deakin (2008, p. 23) and Bradley Watson (1999) consider them a 
combination of ethical theories, with influences from Christian ethics, relativism 
and absolutism.
 To summarise, the three basic problems with military character education 
programmes are firstly, that ancient traditions are not sufficient, and secondly, 
that codes of conduct do not suit the ambition to equip military personnel 
with the desired virtues and values. Finally, educational programmes lack any 
grounding in ethical theory and a connection to educational design. Based on 
these conclusions, this paper argues that, in order to understand how successful 
military character education can be implemented, one first needs to understand 
the preconditions for such character education. The following section therefore 
examines the philosophical foundations of character education, concentrating on 
those aspects especially relevant to the practice of military character education. 
Philosophical Underpinnings of Character Education
Aristotelian Virtue Ethics
For many centuries, character education was based on the teachings of Aristotle. 
He laid the foundations for modern thinking on moral theory, virtue ethics 
and the cultivation of (a moral) character (MacIntyre, 2013; Nussbaum, 2013; 
Sanderse, 2012). For our purposes, three elements are noteworthy: (1) the goal 
of eudaimonia (the good life) and how to achieve it; (2) the pupil; and (3) the 
relation between individual development and being part of the community.
 Eudaimonia is a central concept in Aristotelian virtue ethics and is best 
translated as the fulfilment of human potential. Virtues are those qualities that 
will enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia, and virtue ethics aims to 
transform the young person into a flourishing human being (Kristjánsson, 2013; 
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MacIntyre, 2013). To be virtuous is to find the right balance between two vices—
for example, courage (a virtue) is balanced between rashness and cowardice (both 
vices). According to Aristotle, we can be gifted with natural traits and talents—in 
fact, we can even inherit a natural disposition to do, on occasion, the right thing—
but this is not to be confused with the possession of virtue. Rather, via systemic 
training or habituation, the pupil will learn how not to fall prey to “their own 
emotions and desires”, and will thus internalise virtuous behaviour (MacIntyre, 
2013, p. 149). A pupil of Aristotle is required to learn how to regulate one’s own 
behaviour and, moreover, to internalise the rationality and behaviour appropriate 
for a virtuous life, which “is concerned with the development of inner discipline, 
with people beginning to look critically at themselves” (Wortel & Bosch, 2011, 
p. 21). Self-regulation, personal development and the internalisation of values 
are considered far more relevant than external rules and it should therefore be 
unsurprising that, in the Aristotelian tradition, there is relatively little mention 
of rules and regulations. However, there are bound to be occasions in which no 
formula applies and, in these instances, the individual has to act for the right 
reasons and out of trained habit (MacIntyre, 2013).
 Yet, according to Aristotle, character education suits only a privileged group. 
Such a group consists of young men, endowed with intellectual, political, 
military and creative talents and experience—those encouraged by their parents 
and previous teachers “to think of citizenship as their future sphere, [and] 
practical wisdom as their goal” (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 55–56). However, these 
criteria reveal a circular argument: in order to receive character education, one 
has to have a solid intellectual, cultural and practical underpinning. Character 
education is thus not simply about the internalisation of new habits or behaviour, 
but rather builds upon existing internal dispositions.
 Additionally, for Aristotle, the relationship between personal development and 
being a member of the community is important and unquestionable. He sees both 
personal development and being a member of the political community (polis) as 
essential for achieving eudaimonia. This idea reveals a more complex argument, 
explored by Alasdair MacIntyre (2013), who explains that “the virtues are all in 
harmony with each other and the harmony of individual character is reproduced 
in the harmony of the state” (pp. 156–157). Thus, in Aristotle’s conception 
of “the good life”, the development of the individual and the community are 
intertwined.
Bildung as an Educational Concept
For Aristotle, character education is not an individual enterprise. Rather, being 
a flourishing individual is directly connected to being part of the community. 
Following a similar logic, Bildung idealists, such as Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
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Werner Jaeger, and Johann Gottfried von Herder, emphasise the need for people 
to become educated members of the nation (Forster, 2018). There are further 
similarities because, in the tradition of Bildung, ideals from ancient Greek culture 
were borrowed to establish a cultural and intellectual elite. The main features of 
Bildung are an idea of common kinship and the unity of mankind, and the adoption 
of classic insights as an educational and cultural ideal for the formation of both 
mind and character. This formation is a process of educating man towards his 
“true form”—the real and genuine human nature—and carries a normative notion 
of culture. The best way to educate, according to von Humboldt, is to let people 
develop themselves by means of a classic education (Humboldt, 1963, p. 125).
 Historically, Bildung has a wide variety of interpretations, ranging from the 
spiritual to the biological, and from the political to the educational. Whilst today 
we encounter Bildung mostly as a political and educational ideal, in its early 
usage, Bildung had a strong moral and spiritual meaning, instructing Christians 
to cultivate their talents and dispositions according to the image of God (Biesta, 
2002; Horlacher, 2004, 2015; Løvlie & Standish, 2002; Reindal, 2012). Yet, 
Bildung could also refer to a biological ideal. In the 16th century, the term Bildung 
was used, amongst others, by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1786) to refer 
to “the development or unfolding of certain potentialities within an organism” 
(Schmidt, 1996, p. 630). In the 18th century, Bildung evolved into a political 
term, mainly associated with a disciplining system for citizens. Herder’s (1784–
1791) definition illustrates this transition: “Bildung refers to the products not of 
God’s handwork, but of an impersonal genetic force that . . . drives human beings 
towards ever higher cultural achievements” (as cited in Boes, 2008, p. 275). 
Noteworthy here is the idea of a higher culture that can only come into existence 
in a more developed and institutionalised society. Herder described this as a 
totality of experiences that imparts a coherent identity and sense of common 
destiny to a people. With this definition, he laid the basis for the modern political 
idea of the nation state. Around the same time, Bildung was introduced as an 
educational concept in the military. General von Scharnhorst (1793), convinced 
that the improvement of the scientific and technical education of officers was 
necessary, found that “only well-educated people sought to alleviate the horrors 
of war, and that uneducated officers were just as bestial as the rank and file” (as 
cited in Schoy, 2011, p. 9).
 Today, Bildung continues to carry this political and developmental connotation 
(Bauer, 1997). In its political meaning, Bildung is connected to an ideal society 
and a specific conceptualisation of the ideal citizen within such a society. 
This tradition takes a normative position, prescribing “the cultural content of 
education” (Reindal, 2012, p. 537). The supposition here is that character is 
to be imposed on the person—like an external (normative) state, or a formal 
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competency, closely linked to the existence of a political community—to the 
point that, in its political meaning, the ideal of Bildung has become “entrapped 
in cultural arrogance and dull conformism” (Løvlie & Standish, 2002, p. 317).
 In the developmental tradition, Bildung refers to the humanist legacy, in which 
the focus lies on personal development and growth, and “the goal of education 
was to help students realise the ideal of modernity, which is for the individual 
to become a self-directed, self-formed person” (Good & Garrison, 2010, pp. 
52–53). It emphasises “a specific kind of self-experience and self-development 
summarised in the phrase Sich-Bilden or ‘self-education’” (Reindal, 2012, 
p. 537; see also Nordenbo, 2002). Central to the developmental tradition “is 
the question of what constitutes an educated or cultivated human being. The 
answer to this question is not given in terms of discipline, socialisation or moral 
training” (Biesta, 2002, p. 378). Instead, developmental Bildung idealises the 
kind of thinking that initiates a process “of how knowledge becomes internalised” 
(Reindal, 2012, p. 547). In this tradition, education is a long-term process that 
can be understood as a process of self-realisation or living up to one’s full 
potential. The pupil receives the freedom to integrate knowledge and transform 
it internally and intrinsically.
 The developmental interpretation of Bildung, referring to an educational ideal 
of strengthening students innate powers and character developments, is currently 
extremely popular in research commissions on the future of education (Løvlie 
& Standish, 2002, p. 318). This popularity promotes the need for an education 
focused on self-experience, self-reflection and self-development.6 Here also, 
one can easily identify the expectation that Bildung supports both individual 
development and the formation of “good” (global) citizens. Proponents of this 
type of Bildung state that character education can only take place in open-ended 
learning situations—those guided by goals of individual development. Rather 
than pursuing measurable learning objectives, it focusses on forming a self-
reflexive attitude. 
6 Jet Bussemaker, the former Dutch Minister of Education, uses the term explicitly when discussing 
the future of education: “In the 21st century Bildung stands for a better understanding of the world, 
a strong moral compass and empathy, ground-breaking thinking and acting, and self-development 
driven by curiosity and critical thinking” (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, 
2015, p. 6). This interest is not only prominent in the Netherlands. In Norway, a national research 
committee recommends understanding Bildung as a form of cultivation in the liberal arts tradition 
(Reindal, 2012). A Yale report highlights various virtues as normative—for instance, critical 
deliberation, curiosity, autonomy, involvement, collaboration and participation for the greater good. 
Thus, the report highlights the liberal arts tradition as a foundation for developing skills that can 
be utilised in whatever line of work a student eventually chooses (Committee on Yale College 
Education Working Groups, 2003, as cited in Reindal, 2012, p. 536).
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Contemporary Character Education
Pursuing both political and developmental Bildung implies a certain tension 
between an external imposition and authentic development. This educational 
paradox is elaborated upon in contemporary theories on (character) education 
by authors such as David Graeber (2015), Martha Nussbaum (2012), Ewald 
Engelen, Fernandez and Hendrikse (2014), Lars Løvlie and Paul Standish (2002), 
and Ger Biesta (2016). If we look at today’s dominant educational paradigm, 
there is a preference for the use of externally imposed norms. Most educational 
programmes have an extreme focus on efficiency, measurability and quantifiable 
knowledge. However, as Nussbaum (2012, pp. 95–120) argues, to deal with the 
inherent complexities of real life, education should instead focus on more than 
calculable rational knowledge: we need liberal arts education to deal with the 
complexities of today’s world, but also for the formation of democratic citizens 
of the world. In a similar fashion, Biesta (2016, p.4) argues that the educational 
way, the slow, difficult, frustrating and weak way, may not be the most popular 
way in an impatient society. But in the long run it may well turn out to be the only 
sustainable way, since we all know that systems aimed at total control eventually 
collapse under their own weight.  
 The essence of this discussion was expressed by John Dewey (2007), when 
he said that “to imposition from above is opposed expression and cultivation 
of individuality[;] to static aims and materials is opposed acquaintance with a 
changing world” (p. 19). Similarly, Kristján Kristjánsson (2012) wonders: 
How can it be simultaneously true that the aim of moral education is to create 
individuals who, moved by their own conception of the good, cherish and 
assiduously apply their unencumbered autonomy and that this goal can best be 
achieved through means that necessarily involve an extrinsic motivation? (pp. 32–33)
Following the arguments of, among others, Nussbaum, Dewey and Biesta, it 
becomes clear that a lack of attention for the individual runs the risk of making 
character education an inward-looking practice, which henceforth, might 
eventually collapse under its own weight. In this argument we recognise the 
indissoluble, paradoxical connection between individual development and 
external norms. Neither Aristotle, nor Von Humboldt, nor the present-day authors 
mentioned above, intend(ed) to separate the two. Leading an active, community-
oriented life in the polis is part of eudaimonia. Being a well-developed 18th-
century German citizen implied being part of a modern nation state, whilst today, 
being equipped to deal with the complexities of the world requires a certain 
level of self-realisation and individual development in dialogue with the wider 
(globalised) world.
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Preconditions and Implications
The foregoing discussion makes clear the discrepancy between character 
education in its ideal form and current practice at military academies. This 
section discusses four preconditions and their implications for military 
academies: (1) the insufficiency of rule-based education; (2) the development of 
rational habituation; (3) an understanding of Bildung as ‘building on’; and (4) an 
acknowledgement of the paradox within character education.
 The first precondition—the insufficiency of rule-based education—states 
that rules alone do not constitute character education. Rules and regulations 
are explicitly not a part of Aristotelian character education; rather, they were 
considered merely an instrument for the polis. Virtue ethics and Bildung aim 
to help develop the individual into someone who can regulate his or her own 
behaviour, has a certain inner discipline and will, and on that basis, not need 
external rules. This is in strong opposition to classic military education, which 
is best known for its hierarchy, rules, regulations and disciplining learning 
environment. 
 Furthermore, virtue ethics are concerned with the internalisation of reasoning 
and appropriate behaviour—both for a virtuous life and in Bildung, reason is 
considered essential. Virtuous behaviour is the result of a trained rational 
approach—the ability to choose the mean between two vices, acquired through 
rational thinking and habituation. This leads to the second precondition, namely 
the development of rational habituation. Traditionally, military education is 
dominated by teaching drills and skills. Whilst this does imply habituation, it 
misses the point of a trained rational habit, since there is practically no reflection 
involved. Moreover, because moral training at military academies is often 
compressed into only a small number of lessons, the development of habituation 
in moral thinking is restricted.
 The third precondition—understanding Bildung as ‘building on’—refers 
to the necessity to build on existing (practical) knowledge. Virtue ethics and 
Bildung both require a broad intellectual and practical background. Learning is 
considered a life-long process, starting with parental guidance and continuing 
through the practice of political membership. Thus, character education is, in 
essence, a slow, risky and open-ended process. Ideally, a student is given time to 
transform internally and intrinsically. However, in a military context, a cadet is 
expected to learn morally responsible behaviour via a small number of lessons. 
Notably, from a philosophical perspective, character education differs from 
contemporary military education, not only in its extended time frame, but also in 
its emphasis on building on existing aspects of the individual’s character. Most 
military education is based on the principle of “unlearning” existing behaviour 
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and replacing it with new behaviours and skills specific to the military (Goffman, 
1961; Moelker, 2000). However, in character education, “the onus is not the 
usefulness of practical skills, but rather which potential is present in a student 
and how [that potential can] be developed to fruition in freedom” (van Baarda & 
Verweij, 2006, p. 12).
 The final precondition is an acknowledgement of the paradox within character 
education. In virtue ethics, Bildung, and contemporary educational theory, the 
practice of self-development cannot be separated from the social and the political, 
and thus the normative environment in which self-development takes place. In 
fact, they are two sides of the same coin: individual self-development and the 
communal—social and political—contexts are intertwined. Any attempt to separate 
the two spheres runs the risk of creating a standardised, ineffective learning 
environment with only extrinsically motivated individuals, focussing strongly 
on the military context and losing sight of the social and political contexts. It is 
obvious that this will have detrimental effects on military operations—especially 
those that aim to “win the hearts and minds” of local populations.
Conclusion
It has become clear that, in order to deal with the complexities of 21st-century 
warfare, military organisations consider ethics and moral professionalism to be 
pivotal elements of adequate military leadership and education. Traditionally, 
this particular learning process has been the domain of character education. In 
this paper it was argued that character education at Western military academies 
is more often guided by classic modernist traditions, hierarchy and military 
socialisation than based on a coherent educational philosophy and strategy. With 
regard to the latter, I discussed how character education was understood in the 
context of Aristotelian virtue ethics, the tradition of Bildung and contemporary 
educational philosophy. Based on this analysis, four preconditions for character 
education were formulated and the implications of these for contemporary 
military education were discussed. These preconditions and implications go 
against the dominant paradigm on (military) education, but have the potential to 
guide possible change, aiming to contribute to its wider reassessment.
 It is important to realise that the preconditions for character education are 
established as a result of a constant deliberation of options: What should aspirant 
officers know? What do they want to know? What should they become, and 
what do they want to become? Exactly these deliberations lie at the heart of 
character education. By answering these questions for students and not letting 
them answer these questions themselves—by, for example, imposing more rules 
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and regulations—an educational institute loses the opportunity for students to 
develop intrinsically motivated, ethical behaviour. Thus, students will most likely 
be better served with a less prescriptive form of education—one that exhibits 
a strong emphasis on self-development in a complex and multi-dimensional 
setting. As military academies aim to train leaders to function in future conflicts, 
it would be beneficial to teach them to think critically, instead of teaching 
them to thoughtlessly comply with the rules. The battlefields of the future are 
characterised by flexible complexity, and thus require reflective practitioners.
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MILITARY MORES
AN INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY
Abstract
Military education is for most people an unknown process that takes place behind 
closed doors. Based on text analysis, eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork, 
and interviews at the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA), this article seeks to 
understand military education as a dynamic process between the cadets’ experience 
and the institute. As such, this study can be understood as an institutional 
ethnography, intending to open the black-box of military education. This study 
shows that military education affects cadets in a powerful way. They quickly learn 
to navigate the “underlife” of the institute by carefully avoiding confrontation with 
the official structures. In a final discussion, we identify two remarkable paradoxes—
perfect imperfection and individual in the system—that we consider exemplary 
for the learning environment at the NLDA. We argue that the Defence Academy 
constitutes, in essence, a paradoxical learning environment that influences the 
character development of the cadets—sometimes in unintended ways.
This chapter has been previously published as:
Marenne Mei Jansen & E. H. Kramer (2019) Military mores – an institutional ethnography, 
Ethnography and Education, 14:4, 512-526, DOI: 10.1080/17457823.2018.1471612. 
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Introduction
This is the military reality. A reality about life and death. In this reality it is not 
about doing things right, but about doing the right things. Ladies and gentlemen, 
that requires leadership. Leadership implies that you have to inspire, stimulate and 
put people at the centre of your attention. Even if you are really down yourself. A 
military leader leads, and should dare to take the lead. You have to know what is 
possible and be willing to take risks. To be able to do that, and to actually take the 
lead, does not come easy. It requires character. Character and formation. Physical 
formation; to operate under extreme circumstances. Academic formation; to be able 
to also take the lead in complex situations, within an innovative organisation. But 
above all, it requires personal formation; to not give up, when things get hard. To 
push boundaries, and to deal with complex, often ethical dilemmas. This formation 
takes place at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy. Midshipmen and cadets, do 
not underestimate this formation. It is the key to your success.
—General Middendorp (2016, translation by the author)
General Middendorp, Chief of Defence for the Netherlands, spoke these words 
to staff and aspirant officers of the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) at the 
opening of the 2016 academic year. In this speech, he explains the importance 
of character formation and leadership. According to General Middendorp, a solid 
training at the NLDA is required in order to do this work. 
 As servicemen are continuously confronted with ethical challenges and 
operational complexities during operations, the objective of most modern military 
academies is to train their cadets and midshipmen to become excellent military 
leaders. For example, the UK Defence Academy calls leadership “the life blood of 
the army” (Sandhurst, 2014, p. 1), whilst West Point in the USA aims “to educate, 
train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned 
leader of character” (United States Military Academy West Point, 2017, p. 1). 
As a final example, the Canadian Defence Academy states that “it generates 
the leaders of today and tomorrow who are prepared to deliver institutional and 
operational excellence” (Canadian Defence Academy, 2016, p. 1). However, 
despite the fact that the education of future military leaders is the core ambition 
of military academies, the exact process of military education remains rather 
mysterious. Even staff members of military academies themselves admit that there 
is “no clearly articulated ‘learning model’ or theory for how to develop leaders 
of character” (Ruggero, 2001, p. 3). Thus, although considered pivotal for future 
military leaders, the practice of military education remains a “black-box” (Fosher, 
2013, p. 85, p. 98; Latour, 2005). 
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 However, military education is not a practice or something that only military 
academies engage with. There is vast body of academic studies that seek to 
understand military education from a variety of perspectives. In the objectivist 
or “traditional problem-solving approach” (Sookermany, 2017, p. 310), military 
education is understood as a process in which skills are accumulated in order 
to achieve a certain end product—i.e. a military leader. Such studies focus on 
questions such as what kinds of skills, traits or competencies a military leader 
should possess, especially in the light of the increased complexity of modern 
military missions (Atwater & Yammarinol, 1993; Caforio, 2000, 2006; Franke 
& Heinecken, 2001; Grossman, 2009; Segal, 1986). Whilst these studies can be 
helpful resources for the design of concrete interventions, they rarely openly 
address the practices that underpin existing educational processes. Opposed to 
this objectivist approach, a more qualitative approach draws upon the work of 
Erving Goffman (1961) and Pierre Bourdieu (1986, 2000). Bourdieu (2000) 
attempts to understand “the social setting as a specific habitus [that] is acquired 
through education, training, and discipline within particular organizations” (p. 
164). Goffman (1961) describes military academies as an ideal example of his 
concept of a “total institution”—a social entity embracing the individual’s life 
and identity in its entirety. Studies following this tradition intend to develop 
a more comprehensive perspective on the internal social organisation of the 
military establishment, questioning social or political practices (Janowitz, 1961; 
Lang, 1972). 
 Both objectivist and qualitative approaches take the institute—in this case the 
military academy—as a starting point for their analyses. Only a small number of 
studies focus specifically on the experience of those “undergoing” the educational 
process—in this case, the cadets. In this article we argue that one needs to 
take both perspectives into account in order to give a rounded representation 
of military education and to understand what is really “going on” (Goffman, 
1974, p. 8) at a military academy. Therefore, based on textual analysis, eighteen 
months of ethnographic fieldwork, and interviews at the Netherlands Defence 
Academy, this article seeks to understand military education as a dynamic 
process occurring between the cadets’ experience and the institute. This study 
is focused on infantry in particular. It is set-up as an institutional ethnography—
one that intends to open the “black-box” of military education. 
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Research Strategy
Access and Position 
In ethnographic research, a long-term connection to the field of study and an open—
although informed—perspective are crucial elements (Agar, 1996; Fetterman, 
2010; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Moreover, because entering the military 
community is considered rather difficult for civilian researchers (Dalenberg, 2017; 
Fosher, 2013), our positions as researchers cannot remain undiscussed. As the first 
author, I was specifically hired for this research project at the NLDA in 2014, and 
carried out the field research. The second author, E. H. Kramer, has been a professor 
at the NLDA since 1996 and contributed to the analysis. These posts made it 
possible for us “to study at first hand what people do and say in particular contexts” 
(Hammersley, 2006, p. 4, emphasis in original). Further, they explain our access to 
the military academy and clarify the use of I and we throughout this article. 
 Clearly, our professional positions explain our long-term connection, and justify 
our claim to an informed perspective. Yet, precisely because we are part of the 
institute, they also raise questions of validity. Whilst we are well aware of this 
possible shortcoming, we are confident that this proximity did not compromise 
our academic analysis. In fact, the cooperation between a senior staff member and 
a newcomer ensured a critical and dynamic dialogue throughout the study. For 
example, whereas I initially considered myself to be an outsider, along the way 
the experience also affected me. I adjusted my use of language, partly in order to 
be able to address certain topics, and partly to demonstrate that I could, at least in 
some ways, be considered as “one of them”. We argue that such effects illustrate 
the powerful mechanisms of military education, and thus merely serve to underline 
the importance of an ethnographic study of this type. Finally, there are few people 
“that have the kind of access and depth of experience that working within those 
organizations can bring”, and even fewer that “have the opportunity to bring data 
out of places that are often black holes” (Fosher, 2013, p. 98)—an opportunity that 
we had. 
Institutional Ethnography
As we are particularly interested in the dynamic between the institutional structures 
and the cadets’ experience, this study was set up as an institutional ethnography 
(Smith, 1987, 2006). Typically, institutional ethnographies “begin with people’s 
everyday lives, and then examine how institutional structures and practices, including 
policies, become texts that help shape and organize everyday experience” (Levinson, 
Sutton, & Winstead, 2009, p. 776). However, they are not the same as ethnographies 
of, or within, an institution. Instead, they “focus on the explication of discursively 
organised social settings and the social relations that are at work within them, rather 
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than on the participants as a population, and their understanding of the setting in 
which they find themselves” (Campbell & Gregor, 2004 as cited in Tummons, 2010, 
p. 348).
 For this study, we investigated how cadets experience military education within 
the institutional structures of the NLDA. In doing so, this study does more than 
simply reproduce the cadets’ experience; rather, it seeks to understand how the 
institutional structures and practices of the NLDA shape the experiences of military 
education of infantry cadets. 
Data Collection and Analysis
Institutional ethnographies “rely on both discursive analysis and ethnographic 
methods, such as participant observations, and interviews, to relate institutional 
discourses with people’s actions” (Vaughan III, 2017, p. 4). This study is based 
on an analysis of key documents of the NLDA, a year-long explorative research, 
eighteen months of periodic participant observation, and over five hundred hours 
of transcribed interviews. 
 The first phase of fieldwork was explorative and consisted mainly of talking to 
cadets, midshipmen, military and academic staff, instructors, operational officers 
and civilian defence staff, and reading up on education at the NLDA. The objective 
of this initial phase was to selectively narrow our focus, and gain an understanding 
of the key concepts of life at the NLDA, such as character education and leadership 
development. 
 Subsequently, we collected texts that constitute the institutional discourse 
(Tummons, 2010). From these we selected key documents—such as course 
documents, military handbooks, course manuals and internal auditing reports on 
education at the NLDA—that could be considered representative of the discourse 
of the military organisation in general, and the NLDA in particular. Simultaneously, 
the second phase of fieldwork commenced. In August 2015, when a new cohort 
of aspirant officers entered the academy, two randomly assigned platoons became 
the focus of this study: one platoon with high school graduates (long track); and 
one platoon consisting of university graduates (short track).1 Over the following 
1 The NLDA offers both long and short track programmes. Former high school students are admitted 
to the long track programme (four years), and university graduates can enrol in the short track 
programme (eighteen months). During the first five months both groups follow an initial military 
training, in which they are trained to a basic military and academic level. The long track programme 
requires an additional three years in which the cadet can obtain a bachelor’s degree. Both 
tracks conclude with job-specific training, tailored to the specific requirements of each military 
specialisation, such as infantry, military administration, medical, or judicial services. In the long 
track platoon, twelve (out of thirteen) cadets agreed to participate. They will study at the NLDA for 
at least four years, unless they decide to quit (which two did very early in the training). From the 
short track platoon eleven (out of twelve) cadets participated.
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eighteen months I was involved in most of the activities of these cadets. The 
majority of my time was spent observing, participating and informally talking with 
cadets, instructors and staff. I accompanied them on three overnight bivouacs, was 
present during their hazing period, attended classes and relaxed in quieter times 
between activities. 
 Additionally, semi-structured interviews with the cadets were conducted in 
groups of three or four every three months. During these sessions, we talked about 
their backgrounds, dreams, frustrations and ambitions concerning their military 
education at the NLDA. Subsequently, the interviews were analysed, first via open 
coding, and thereafter via axial coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Friese, 2014). 
The Netherlands Defence Academy: An Ethnography
Subsequent to a general description of the Netherlands Defence Academy and 
its education, we present a reconstruction of its institutional discourse based not 
only on key publications by the institute itself, but also on official speeches from 
the staff. 
Military Education
In an old castle in the south of the Netherlands, the NLDA educates aspirant 
officers. For almost two centuries the objective of the institute has hardly 
changed: “To train the future military leaders” (Commander NLDA, 2016). 
Although offering a variety of programmes for officers at different stages in 
their careers, the institute’s main task is to train cadets and midshipmen for their 
first positions within the military. Before admittance applicants need to pass 
a medical, psychological and physical examination, and are interviewed by a 
commission of high-ranking officers. 
 The espoused pedagogical model of the NLDA combines military training, 
academic education and character education. Military training is performed 
by senior military instructors, whilst academic education is housed within the 
military faculty, albeit taught by staff consisting of both military and non-military 
academics (The Netherlands Defence Academy, 2016a). Although character 
education is understood by the wider Dutch military, the NLDA, and most cadets 
as an essential — if not the most essential — element of military education. It 
is based on tradition rather than method. Sometimes it is addressed formally 
during military training via case studies or in theory classes. More often, it is 
what happens “in between classes”, and during the social activities organised by 
the cadet corps. The corps is considered key to the character education system, 
organising numerous activities aimed at developing skills and an “officer’s 
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attitude” (Dalenberg, 2017; Groen & Klinkert, 2003). This includes both 
obligatory and voluntary extracurricular activities, such as the hazing period, 
sporting activities and social events. Despite the fact that it is not an official 
requirement to become a member of the cadet corps, in practice, all cadets are 
members and active in one or more committees.
The Institutional Discourse on Military Leadership and Education
The aim of the NLDA is to train future military leaders, and this ambition 
is promoted via all of its official outlets. The 2016 annual report states: “By 
offering an integrated programme consisting of military training, personal 
development and academic education, the NLDA makes an important 
contribution to professional leadership” (The Netherlands Defence Academy, 
2016a, p. 7). In official documentation and course descriptions this heroic 
rhetoric never disappears: “Central in our education is to become military 
competent; i.e. professional, flexible, mentally and physically resilient. Officers 
need an adequate professional attitude” (The Netherlands Defence Academy, 
2016b, p. 2). The cadet corps makes use of the same type of language in their 
written outlets, valuing are “honesty, responsibility, decency, obedience, effort, 
creativity, loyalty, collegiality comradeship and respect” (Dalenberg, 2017, p. 
54). Behaving according to their guidelines for etiquette and customs should 
“result in collegiality, comradeship and a sense of unity” (Stolp, 1994, as cited 
in Dalenberg, 2017, p. 22). This leadership discourse, promoting military values 
and character, is also frequently emphasised in the form of the spoken word. 
During the course of this research, the NLDA commander frequently employed 
motivational speaking, stating that cadets possess high personal potential, and 
need to be “24/7 aware of their function, to be an ambassador of the system, and 
to be personally responsible for all opportunities presented to them to improve 
themselves” (Commander NLDA, 2016). 
 The leadership doctrine of the complete defence organisation confirms this 
point of view: “In a complex and dynamic environment it is not easy to navigate 
further development of character, competencies and an adaptive learning ability 
is required” (Dalenberg, Folkerts, & Bijlsma, 2014, p. 38, translation mine). 
Clearly, the central message is that cadets and midshipmen, as aspirant officers, 
should learn to behave in accordance with military values, and be prepared for 
the extreme demands they will encounter in their professional roles.
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Military Education as an Experience
After discussing how the institute talks about military education, in this section 
we aim to provide an insight into how cadets experience their military education 
at the NLDA. Codification of the transcribed interview data led us to identify two 
themes as exemplary of the experience of military education: self-improvement 
and membership. Quotes were anonymised, but attributed to short track (ST) or 
long track (LT) cadets, and given a number (1 = the first interview, to 6 = the last 
interview) in order to reveal perspective changes over time. 
Self-Improvement
In line with the three pillars of military education (military, academic and 
character education), cadets spoke about improving themselves physically, 
intellectually, and in terms of character. Regarding physical improvement, both 
short and long track cadets felt that the NLDA had a lot to offer. For infantry 
(physically the most demanding specialisation), the body is considered of great 
importance. The (physical) differences between the infantry and the other cadets 
were often discussed—most often felt to be related to a difference in mentality. 
As one of the cadets explained: “Most infantry cadets feel the urge to do extra 
trainings and discuss how to improve their strength and fitness” (LT3). Some 
were careful not to label this in a normative manner, but did emphasise that 
“there is a difference; we are often the ones who carry the heavy stuff, the ones 
that are on time, and have our shit together” (ST2). Others bluntly stated: “We, 
the infantry, are faster, more proactive and stronger than the others. That’s ok, 
they will do administrative jobs. It is just a pity that we are not being challenged 
enough” (LT3). For many, their first disappointment in the NLDA was that the 
physical training was not as demanding as that for which they had trained prior 
to joining. In fact, the majority stated that they felt they had actually lost strength 
since the start of their training. 
 During the first months, most short-track cadets had the feeling their 
intellectual capacity decreased. Many stated that at university, they had felt 
intellectually challenged, whilst the lessons and assignments at the NLDA were 
perceived as boring, tedious and too easy: “I expected to learn more, to have 
debates appropriate for an officer, but I was wrong, you just have to memorise 
certain doctrines” (ST5). However, some long track cadets expressed how they 
experienced difficulties in keeping up with the academic requirements of the 
NLDA. Two long track cadets who voluntarily stopped, said that the academic 
burden was too demanding.
 Thirdly, within the subcategory of character education, we found big 
differences between short track and long track cadets. For instance, when asked 
63
Study 2  M
ilitary M
ores
what they expected to learn, a group of long track cadets started listing habits 
they found inappropriate for officers, like being lazy, unorganised, or late: “I 
think the NLDA can help me to become a better version of myself” (LT2). 
They explained that their family members noticed positive changes in their 
behaviour. Conversely, short track cadets seemed rather unimpressed with the 
programme of character education. Indeed, they seemed more cynical about the 
whole NLDA experience. One commented: “I just want to finish these eighteen 
months, and then get on with the real work” (ST4). Another cadet, albeit one 
who never intended to stay long, simply stated that the NLDA offered the best 
hands-on leadership courses: “This is the best education for leadership in The 
Netherlands, I’ll just do this for some time, and then move on to real business” 
(ST2). In general, short track cadets seemed more pragmatic and transactional in 
their expectations.
Membership
Throughout all our conversations membership appeared to be an important 
concept. In the words of the cadets, becoming a soldier also entails “un-
becoming” a civilian. In the following discussion, we understand membership in 
the context of the struggle to (un)become part of the military institute. 
 When entering the academy, all cadets expressed insecurity about their 
military identity. Not only did they feel like “newbies”, but the clear visibility 
of this fact seemed to disturb them even more. As their uniform fittings were, 
for logistical reasons, postponed until later, they had their classes in civilian 
clothing, and thus visibly stood out at the academy: “You feel really like such a 
newbie, like your first day in high-school. Only instead of a huge bag pack you are 
now wearing your newbie-hat” (LT1). Over time the cadets were rewarded with 
an increasing number of visible attributes to their military identity (uniforms, 
emblems, t-shirts, etc.), showing their belonging to several groups: the military, 
the cadet corps and the infantry. These symbols were received with enthusiasm 
by most, and were felt to signify a belonging to something “bigger”. 
 Aside from official symbols, the physical appearance of the cadets was of 
great importance. Their specialisation—infantry—is supposed to be the fittest 
group, hence, being physically fit seemed an appropriate way to distinguish 
oneself: “You know, it is partially a physical thing, but it is also about who we 
are, and about connecting a certain prototype of being a soldier” (LT1). In the 
subsequent months, not only did the cadets’ physical appearance change, so did 
their use of language. Soldiers have a specific, well-developed jargon, hardly 
understandable to outsiders. The cadets quickly mastered this jargon, making 
use of the numerous abbreviations, acronyms and specific phrases and sentences, 
like the untranslatable expression er van zijn, to indicate that something is your 
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responsibility; civilians, a word hardly used in Dutch daily language, except in the 
military to indicate non-military people; lupa (lunch pakket) for lunch package; 
bipla (binnenplaats) for courtyard; and groza (grote zaal) for big hall. These 
slang words are contractions of regular Dutch words. During the interviews, 
observations and data analysis the increased uniformity of language was one 
of the most audible signs of the cadets becoming members of the organisation. 
Along with these changes came a more self-assured tone of voice, and feeling 
more at ease in their military and cadet identity. 
 The main ambition in terms of membership was the distinction between being 
a civilian and being in the military. As one cadet remarked: “I think the first month 
is about transitioning from civilian to military. There is not one single aspect that 
does this. It is merely the combination of everything; room inspection, bivouac, 
commando training, the hazing period” (LT3). After roughly two months, when 
this transition was taken for granted, other memberships, like the cadet corps 
and their specialisations, became more important. Not only did the cadets want 
to become members of these groups, they also experienced this as a requirement 
on their way to becoming an officer. 
 After this initial two- to three-month period, the cadets even started to feel 
capable of knowing who should be in, and who should be out. This became 
especially apparent when two of the infantry cadets decided to quit. Comments 
varied from empathic understanding to anxiety towards their own future, and 
anger towards those who left. A common denominator, however, was that 
the majority of the cadets had an explicit idea about what should be the right 
mentality, that the ones who left did not fit in the first place, or that they had 
entered with the wrong ambition. What was most striking about these comments 
was the rapid transition—the quest for membership, soon transformed from an 
ambition to belong, to being an “insider” capable of knowing who does (and who 
does not) fit in.
Navigating the Underlife
The previous sections gave an impression of prevailing institutional discourses 
and narratives, and (some) of the people active within the institute. In this 
analysis we add our observations and reveal the connections between dominant 
institutional discourses and the cadets’ experience of military education. 
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Observations
Especially during the initial months, cadets understood the NLDA as a place 
where you can learn to become a “better version of yourself”. The NLDA was 
presented as providing both the training and the environment necessary for one 
to become a military leader. However, the cadets had not entered the programme 
seeking a place in which they would be given the freedom and the liberty to grow 
at their own pace. Indeed, as time passed, the majority of the recruits described 
the programme as too soft and not strict enough. They had expected to suffer, 
physically as well as mentally. This factor is particularly well-illustrated by 
the importance of the so-called “moments”. A “moment” typically refers to a 
point in training when physical and mental endurance is required. The learning 
objectives of these “moments” are, however, not explicitly defined, nor did 
cadets feel capable of explaining them precisely. Their content varied from 
acquiring a new skill paired with frustration, to not giving up when tired or cold. 
Cadets were unanimous about their benefits, specifically with regard to their 
future leadership potential. Instructors stated that their objective is to let all of 
the cadets have “their moments” in order to improve, and grow into their roles 
as military leaders. All of them—instructors, short and long track cadets alike—
had a focus on “experiencing moments”, to be challenged, to suffer and emerge 
improved as a result. 
 Overall, it was remarkable to notice that, whilst expecting self-improvement, 
most of the cadets felt the institute did not challenge them enough. In this regard, 
they dealt with a lot of frustrations. On the one hand, they always had a fully 
booked schedule, thus having the obligation to physically be somewhere. On the 
other hand, they often felt bored, often had to wait or sit in unchallenging classes. 
According to the cadets these frustrations were the result of mismanagement 
within the institute, or due to uninspired instructors and/or other cadets. They 
never blamed themselves, or the military organisation per se. It was interesting to 
notice that, despite these feelings, the overall image of the military organisation 
continued to be positive. Most of the cadets emphasised the fact that they 
considered the organisation to be a great place to work for and to be part of. 
 This apparent contradiction was of great interest to the study, as it prompted 
the question of how the cadets rationalised this inconsistency. It transpired that 
membership—this “sense of belonging”—was an extremely strong motivator. 
The military organisation thrives on teamwork. From the beginning, the recruits 
learn that the team is more important than the individual. Not only do the recruits 
learn a profession, simultaneously they make new best friends, colleagues and are 
drilled to support each other “no matter what”. This “membership” is for many 
soldiers the strongest motivation for their work (Grossman, 2009; McPherson, 
1997). For the cadets, this sense of belonging was an important motivator, and 
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one that grew stronger over time, as is illustrated by a conversation we had about 
motivations to enlist. 
 Many of the cadets were motivated by the promise of adventure, and by a 
strong desire not to do a “regular” office job. Others had family in the army and 
wanted to follow in the family tradition. Still others said they felt the country 
needed them at this time of global insecurity, or had enrolled because they 
wanted to do something good and purposeful. For one cadet, this theme was 
specifically related to having a religious background. Despite these initially 
varied motivations, after roughly six months most of the long track cadets started 
to talk more and more about the group and the team as a reason to continue. 
Whilst the motivations of short track students did not change as much over 
time, all of the interviewees—without exception—talked about the importance 
of belonging to an organisation and the people in it. Although most cadets felt 
especially connected to the infantry, other feelings of belonging shifted from 
moment to moment. In the early weeks, the cadets mainly connected with their 
room-mates and platoon. Later this narrow circle expanded to their group-mates 
from the hazing period, and later on to the people living on the same floor in 
the cadet residence. For all the cadets being part of the military and not being a 
civilian was of importance.
Rite of Passage 
Reflecting on the cadets’ narratives about transitioning to new memberships and 
striving to become better versions of themselves, we recognised that—without 
realising it—the cadets tell typical stories of rites of passage (van Gennep, 1960) 
and specifically liminality (Turner, 1987). A rite of passage is typically described 
as a three-phase process people go through when in transition from one group 
to another: separation, liminality and incorporation (van Gennep, 1960). In the 
liminal phase an individual no longer belongs to the previous status, nor to the 
next; one is “betwixt and between” (Turner, 1987). People in this phase are 
“necessarily ambiguous, . . . stripped of their old identity, symbolically by getting 
stripped of clothes, and ground down to a uniform condition, . . . they must obey 
their instructors, and tend to develop an intense comradeship among themselves” 
(Turner, 2017, pp. 95–96). It is not difficult to understand the cadets’ status of 
liminality, leaving their old personae, welcoming their uniforms, and becoming 
“betwixt and between”. However, contrary to Turner’s prediction, the cadets 
did not report experiencing any sense of ambiguity or uncertainty during this 
transition. Although common social uncertainties about complying with social 
standards were discussed, the institute, the final goal (military leadership), and 
the path towards it were hardly questioned. The cadets accepted the events at the 
NLDA with a certain equanimity. This struck us as remarkable; indeed, all of the 
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study’s observations and interviews confirm a far-reaching transformation (for 
example, changes in language, physical appearance and social circle), whereas—
considering the resemblances to rites of passage and liminality—one would 
expect to see more friction.
Secondary Adaptation
The culture of the institute dictates that those within its walls “play by the rules”, 
but also learn to know how and when to subvert them. As such, the NLDA is 
a paradoxical learning environment in which cadets are required to display 
both controlled and calm behaviour, whilst being simultaneously challenged 
and exposed to situations where rougher, less disciplined behaviour—and at 
times even disobedience—is also valued. Goffman (1961) explains that “these 
practices together comprise what can be called the underlife of the institution, 
being to a social establishment what an underworld is to a city” (p. 180, emphasis 
in original). This mechanism is known as “secondary adaptation”—“any habitual 
arrangement by which a member of an organisation employs unauthorised means, 
or obtains unauthorised ends, or both, thus getting around the organisation’s 
assumptions as to what he should do and get and hence what he should be” 
(Goffman, 1961, p. 171). 
 An excellent example of this behaviour can be found in the story of one cadet 
who explained how a Major expected them to behave: 
He told us we could kick in all the doors and get home drunk, as long as they 
wouldn’t notice. In fact he even bragged about things they did when he was a 
cadet, and scrutinised us for being a bunch of sissies for obeying the rules of the 
organisation. (LT2)
This remarkable quote shows that a representative of the institute actually 
challenged the cadets to display secondary adaptation. 
Paradoxes of the NLDA
The institutional discourse embedded in official documents talk of “leadership 
development” through “academic, military and personal formation”, but tells us 
little about how cadets are actually moulded by the NLDA. In this final discussion, 
we identify two remarkable paradoxes: perfect imperfection and individual in the 
system, which we consider exemplary of the learning environment at the NLDA. 
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Perfect Imperfection
In their stories, cadets describe the military organisation as approaching 
perfection. Not only do the cadets subscribe to the values of the organisation, 
they also believe the organisation to be capable and noble in its ambition to 
bring peace and security. This idealised picture is translated into having high 
regard for the capacity of the instructors, their commanders, the academy and 
the organisation in general. Simultaneously, however, they experience the faults 
and flaws of that same organisation on a daily base. Furthermore, cadets are told, 
from recruitment to graduation, to be exceptional; the crème de la crème of society, 
gifted with great talent and endowed with an exceptional sense of morality. They 
un-learn their bad habits from civilian life and learn to be outstanding cadets 
by memorising and trying to behave according to the (military) values. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, over time, most cadets start to feel a personal sense of perfection. 
 Despite (or perhaps also due to) this “perfect” perspective, eventually, most 
cadets notice “cracks” in their dreams. It starts with small things; the food is lousy, 
the uniforms arrive late, the schedule keeps changing, information does not come 
through, people make you wait for a long time, there is not enough material, or 
there are too many cadets to receive the individual coaching that you would have 
liked and think you deserve. In other words, a discrepancy seems to grow between 
the ideal of a benevolent organisation, always doing the right thing, and daily 
reality. Additionally, the widely appreciated military values are not observed by 
all, be it instructors, older cadets, or high-ranking officers. Even daily routines, 
such as being on time, tidy cupboards and wearing the correct uniform, turn out 
to be a façade for some. This quickly lowers, not only the perceived esteem for 
the NLDA, but also for their own roles. “We are merely a student organisation in 
a green suit” (LT4), commented a long track cadet rather disappointed. Within six 
months, cadets found out that the NLDA is just a regular educational institute. For 
many, this turned out to be a disappointing reality, difficult to incorporate with 
the image of an ideal organisation for excellent people, and causing (cognitive) 
dissonance (Festinger, 1962). 
 Many of the cadets discussed at some point how they needed to cope with 
feelings of demotivation related to these frustrations. Nevertheless, their ambition 
to become high-ranking officers persisted, as well as their belief in the “goodness” 
of the military organisation. Surprisingly, cadets as well as their superiors seem 
to be able to deal with this “perfect imperfection”. The culture of comradeship, 
and the promise of being a military leader in the near future, make it worth the 
frustration—or so we are told. Arguably this is a way of denying the paradox, and 
keeping hopes alive in the future. In this explanation, the uncomfortable situation 
at the NLDA is only a temporary obstacle to their ultimate leadership position in 
a “perfect” organisation. 
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Individual in the System 
The second paradox we found rests in the contradiction between individual 
objectives (i.e. to become a competent military leader) and the requirements 
of a military education. We noticed that cadets experienced difficulties with 
appeals to their individual leadership qualities, whilst simultaneously being told 
obedience, the group and hierarchy are all considered essential elements in the 
military organisation.
 To become a military leader, individual development is considered extremely 
important. During the period of admission, prospective cadets are screened on 
individual leadership capacities. During the first weeks, each cadet is required 
to formulate his or her personal development goals. Throughout their education, 
tests and reports are tailored towards individual performance. Cadets are told 
that military leadership is about knowing your own strengths, that each of them 
has to develop a personal style, and that they have to be authentic individuals. 
However, by the very same instructors, they are trained to behave in a rather 
uniform way. Cadets stated that they were told to show “authentic and proactive 
behaviour”, but, “when we do, we are told not to do so” (ST6). Another cadet 
summarised these contradicting demands as follows: “Be authentic, and do what 
I say” (LT5). These paradoxical statements instruct cadets to become authentic, 
creative individual leaders, and to learn how to do that whilst being obedient and 
not standing out. Although seemingly contradictory, none of the cadets in this 
study reported experiencing this double bind as problematic. It was remarkable 
how easily they learnt to navigate between the space between discipline and 
disobedience. Some staff members of the NLDA argued that this is precisely the 
aim of a military education; to learn to “navigate” this paradoxical environment, 
claiming that the cadets who cannot adjust to this reality cannot become 
successful military leaders. 
Conclusion: (Un)intended Intentions
The Netherlands Defence Academy is a particular community with its own 
(unwritten) rules, norms and traditions, which come together to create the 
environment in which the cadets experience their education. Via this institutional 
ethnography, we aimed to gain an understanding of what is actually occurring 
during military education at the NLDA. By representing the cadets’ perspectives 
in relation to the institutional discourse, we intended to open the “black-box” of 
military education, and give an in-depth representation of its efficacy. 
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 In analysing our findings, we distinguished a tension between a strong belief 
in the “perfect organisation”, whilst simultaneously experiencing the faults and 
flaws of that same organisation on a daily basis. Secondly, we noticed that cadets 
experience a tension between being required to function in a strict system, whilst 
simultaneously being expected to be an outstanding individual. We discussed 
that a cadet at the NLDA has to learn how to deal with these paradoxes, and that 
dealing with these paradoxes leads to (unnecessary) confusion, and sometimes 
quick fixes—such as secondary adaptation—that are neither beneficial to the 
cadet, nor to the military organisation. In conclusion, we argue that the NLDA is 
a paradoxical learning environment. 
 We noticed that military education affects cadets in such a powerful way that 
they quickly learn to navigate the “underlife” of the institute, carefully avoiding 
confrontation with the official structures. This form of secondary adaptation can 
be risky, as it is neither coordinated nor agreed on in terms of the educational 
policy of the NLDA. We showed that ultimately this leads to unmotivated and 
hidden behaviour. It makes cadets afraid to fail, to make mistakes, or just be 
different when learning. In fact, it even makes cadets misbehave when they feel 
that they are not being watched—i.e. when instructors are not around, or when 
the learning objectives do not place restrictions on their behaviour. 
 Based on these findings we argue that the present institutional structures and 
practices shape the daily experience of cadets in ways that are less controlled 
than originally intended. However, we also found that sometimes members of 
staff tried to educate cadets to behave in ways that can be classified as secondary 
adaptation. Thus, in a way, these unintended consequences are not entirely 
unintended. Interestingly—and going beyond Goffman’s concept of secondary 
adaptation—we noticed that sometimes the institute tries to teach cadets how 
to behave in the “underlife of the institute”—e.g. “you should kick in doors, as 
long as it goes unnoticed.” As such, it seems that the institute teaches a double 
standard. Some consider the ability to deal with such an environment as crucial 
and the ability to navigate a paradoxical environment as elementary to successful 
military leadership. Nevertheless, we noticed that this is not only confusing to the 
cadets, but it might also suggest the efficacy (or presence of) double standards 
in the professional domain. We are well aware of the fact that any (educational) 
process comes with its own risks, frictions and tensions. However, if one comes 
to understand the process of military education as a paradoxical environment, 
one notices that the behaviour that is acquired through experiencing these 
paradoxes is opposite to the espoused intention of the institute, namely training 
outstanding military leaders who are well aware of the necessary military values. 
This conclusion left us to question to what extent these paradoxes are conducive 
to educating prospective military leaders.
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LEADERSHIP ACCEPTANCE
A case study of military leadership in Afghanistan, 
through the lens of social identity theory
Abstract
This study builds on the experiences of a Dutch reconnaissance platoon deployed 
in Afghanistan in which leadership was not accepted. Set up as a qualitative single 
case study, this article advances our understanding of how group dynamics and 
contextual factors might impact the acceptance of leadership. Rather than primarily 
focusing on the behaviour of the leader, this article highlights the perspective of 
followers in the ranks. The study also offers empirical evidence for the potential of 
social identity theory as a framework within which to study leadership acceptance. 
The case shows that leadership acceptance is largely dependent on group processes, 
rather than on the characteristics of leadership. Additionally, it points to the 
importance of contextual factors. Finally, it suggests that a lack of attention to in-
group dynamics, and a lack of active entrepreneurship by the leader, can catalyse 
“in-group entrepreneurship”. 
This chapter has been previously published as:  
Jansen, M. M., & Delahaij, R. (2019). Leadership Acceptance Through the Lens of Social 
Identity Theory: A Case Study of Military Leadership in Afghanistan. Armed Forces & Society. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X19845027. 
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Introduction
Considering the vast amount of literature written on the subject of leadership, 
one can safely assume that being (or becoming) a leader is a difficult journey in 
which not only acting as a leader, but also being accepted as such can present 
a significant challenge. Even after extensive preparation, when endowed with 
personal charisma and well-versed in theory, at times, a leader can be rejected. 
In this article, we describe a qualitative single case study in which military 
leadership was not accepted. We concentrate on a Dutch reconnaissance platoon, 
consisting of 19 men, deployed in Afghanistan between 2015 and 2016. During 
the deployment, the platoon commander’s leadership was no longer accepted by 
the platoon and, halfway through the mission, he was replaced. The rejection of 
his leadership functions as the starting point for this study. Building on the direct 
experiences of the platoon, this article uses social identity theory as a framework 
within which to analyse leadership acceptance. 
 By using social identity theory as its framework, this study focuses on 
interactions within the group (the platoon), rather than the traditional focus on 
the leadership qualities of the individual. Social identity theory is not commonly 
used for analysing leadership acceptance or case study analysis. We did so 
for reasons both empirical, and theoretical. On a theoretical level, this case 
study afforded us the possibility to investigate the potential of social identity 
theory itself as an analysing framework in an actual working context (Cassar, 
Bezzina, & Buttigieg 2017; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005). Whilst most 
studies examining the potential of social identity theory take place in so-called 
laboratory settings—that is, with artificial study groups (Bergami & Bagozzi, 
2000; Hornsey, 2008)—this was a “real-life” case. As such, this case study can 
contribute to the ecological validity (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000; Sayer, 2010, pp. 
99–103) of social identity theory as a framework for analysis. 
 On an empirical level, social identity theory makes an excellent framework 
for the analysis of military leadership and, in particular, the case at hand. Firstly, 
the focus of social identity theory on group dynamics is a welcome addition to 
traditional military studies, as few studies in the military realm acknowledge 
leadership as a social orientation. The traditional focus in military studies is 
predominantly on individual leadership qualities (Atwater & Yammarinol, 
1993), whilst in a military team—usually a platoon—group dynamics matter 
greatly and can, in some circumstances, be the difference between life and death 
(Arnold, Loughlin, & Walsh, 2016; Grossman, 2009; Vogelaar & Dalenberg, 
2012). Secondly, it has been shown that “the military maintains that cohesive 
groups engender effectiveness in combat situations” (Oliver, Harman, Hoover, 
Hayes, & Pandhi, 1999, cited in Ahronson & Cameron, 2007, p. 9), and that 
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(widening the remit somewhat) “cohesion has long been considered by industrial-
organizational, military, and sports psychologists to be one of the most important 
small-group properties” (Dion, 2000, cited in Ahronson & Cameron, 2007, p. 9). 
Finally, social identity has been identified as an important factor in the success 
of leadership in extreme contexts, such as those facing military organisations 
(Arnold et al., 2016; Dixon, Weeks, Boland Jr, & Perelli, 2017). Thomas Kolditz 
(2006) has defined in extremis leadership as “giving purpose, motivation and 
direction to people when there is eminent physical danger, and where followers 
believe that leader behaviour will influence their physical well-being or survival” 
(p. 657). The extreme contexts in which soldiers are supposed to operate, and 
officers need to give guidance to platoons, are characterised by “uncertainty, time 
pressure, possible catastrophic consequences such as killing or death” (Arnold et 
al., 2016, p. 2). Additionally, we believe that insights from in extremis leadership 
are potentially useful outside of the military realm, because “crisis management is 
considered a strategic competency for executives” (Coombs, 2006, cited in Dixon 
et al., 2017, p. 2). Moreover, “unconventional contexts can sometimes illuminate 
significant management ideas that may have relevance if context and variables are 
considered” (Bamberger & Pratt, 2010, cited in Dixon et al., 2017, p. 2). 
 Studying the relevance of social identity theory in extreme contexts can be 
fruitful because, in these settings, social dynamics play out in a “pressure cooker” 
environment, meaning that the mechanisms existing between leaders and their 
teams come to the fore more swiftly and more pronounced than they would in a 
non-military setting. Social identity theory has the potential to reveal in-group 
dynamics that traditional perspectives leave unnoticed and, therefore, we argue 
that an analysis based on social identity theory can fill a gap in understanding the 
dynamics of the case at hand. 
 In the sections below, first, an elaboration on social identity theory and, 
in particular, its use as an analytical framework for leadership is presented. 
Subsequently, the methodology, design, background and process of data collection 
are explained in section three. In section four, empirical findings—such as excerpts 
from interviews and field notes—are analysed from the perspective of social 
identity theory. In section five, these findings are complemented with additional 
theories and information on various contextual factors. Finally, reflecting on the 
limitations of this study, we end with suggestions for further research, focusing 
on the implications for the military, as well as on the suitability of social identity 
theory as a framework for analysing leadership. 
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Social Identity Theory as a Framework for Analysing 
Military Leadership
Social Identity Theory and Leadership
Traditionally, leadership theories focus on individual leader characteristics as a 
key explanatory mechanism for leadership effectiveness (Reicher et al., 2005; 
Yukl, 2006). Accordingly, leadership is often understood as “individual cognitive 
processes that categorize individuals as leaders” (Hogg, 2001b, p. 199). As a 
result, leadership studies focus predominantly on one particular component or 
attribute of leadership (Reicher et al., 2005)—the individual leader and his or 
her personality.
 As a reaction to this “individualistic metatheory” (Haslam & Reicher, 2016, 
p. 24), in the early 2000s, followership emerged as a new topic within leadership 
studies (Malakyan, 2014, p. 6). Studies on followership acknowledge that leaders 
cannot exist without followers (Riggio, Chaleff, & Lipman-Blumen, 2008) and 
that followers are powerful actors in organisational and social transformation 
(Chaleff, 2009, cited in Malakyan, 2014, p. 7). However, both perspectives 
fail to consider the dynamics that exist between those who follow and those 
who lead (Hogg, 2016; Malakyan, 2014; Rosenbach, Taylor & Youndt, 2012). 
In a further option, Michael Hogg (2001a) suggests that leadership is “a social 
orientation between individuals” (p. 185) and is, to a large extent, dependent on 
interactions within a given group. Contained within this wealth of approaches 
there are, for example, studies that concentrate on leader-member exchanges 
(Hafiidz Bin Maksom & Winter, 2009), or on leadership as a relational dynamic 
within a group (Hogg, 2001a; Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast III, 2012). Within 
this final perspective, social identity theory has been identified as a particularly 
promising framework for analysing the interaction between a leader and his or 
her followers (Cassar et al., 2017; van Dick & Schuh, 2010; Ellemers, de Gilder, 
& Haslam, 2004). 
 Based in social psychology, yet extending into other areas of social science, 
social identity theory is considered “one of the most influential theories of group 
processes and intergroup relations” (Hornsey, 2008, p. 205). Lying at the heart 
of social identity theory is Henri Tajfel’s (1972) concept of social identity, based 
on “the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together 
with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership” 
(p. 292). As such, social identity is different from personal identity, as it is 
derived from belonging to a particular group. The identification is “we”, instead 
of “I” (Griffith, 2009, p. 41). Lale Gumusluoglu, Zahide Karakitapoğlu-Aygün, 
and Terri Scandura (2017) explain that “a person who identifies with a group 
perceives himself or herself as psychologically intertwined with the fate of that 
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entity” (p. 484). As a result, the collective outcome, or the results of the group, 
become of great importance. Social identity theory predicts that, if this is indeed 
the case, group members are likely to show more extreme behaviour in order to 
protect their social identity. When people identify more strongly with a certain 
group, they tend to align their beliefs and behaviours more with the so-called 
“group prototype” (Hogg & Terry, 2000). 
 According to social identity theory, people feel a need to protect their social 
identity through (favourable) group comparisons in order to protect their self-
esteem. Contextual triggers, such as a high-risk environment or other uncertainties, 
can activate self-categorisation (Hornsey, 2008). “Self-categorization theory”, 
explain Michael Hogg and Scott Reid (2006), “focuses on the basic social 
cognitive processes, primarily social categorization, that cause people to identify 
with groups, construe themselves and others in group terms, and manifest group 
behaviours” (p. 9). Consequently, people “stick together” and group members 
accentuate what they believe to be the prototypical behaviour of their group. 
 Social identity theory attempts to explain how group membership not only 
shapes the beliefs people have about in-group and out-group members, but also 
steers intra- and inter-group interactions. In-group members show prototypical 
behaviour, and—dependent on the context—identify against out-group members. 
Therefore, we can see how identification with a specific group motivates 
behaviour that is perceived as consistent with that group’s identity (Ellemers et 
al., 2004). 
 Earlier work on leadership and social identity theory has shown how the 
dynamics that exist between leaders and followers can explain the acceptance 
of leadership in different circumstances. Social identity is instrumental to the 
way in which individuals relate to their social context and deal with uncertainty 
and insecurity alike. When this sense of social identity is put under pressure, 
individuals are more likely to protect their social identity; and more likely to 
scrutinise leadership (Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Hogg, 2001b; van Knippenberg, 
van Knippenberg, de Cremer, & Hogg, 2005). This shift in perspective—from 
the individual to the social context of leadership—makes an analysis based on 
social identity theory more suitable for uncovering in-group mechanisms, rather 
than individual behaviour. 
 Although social identity theory is not commonly used for analysing leadership, 
Stephen Reicher, Alexander Haslam, Michael Platow, and Nik Steffens (2016) 
have developed a new framework for analysing leadership from a social identity 
theory perspective, identifying four dimensions of leadership: Firstly, the leader 
has to “act as one of us”. However, this does not imply that the leader is a typical 
member; rather, the leader should be prototypical—i.e., be an extraordinary 
member (based on Steffens, Haslam, Ryan, & Kessler, 2013). Secondly, he or 
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she needs to “act for us” (Reicher et al., 2016). This means not acting out of self-
interest, power seeking or acting on behalf of an out-group (Platow, Hoar, Reid, 
Harley, & Morrison, 1997). Thirdly, a “successful leader needs to deliver for the 
in-group”, to which Reicher et al. (2016) refer as “collective self-realisation” (p. 
74). This realisation means both “building norms and values into the group itself”, 
and taking actions to “transform the practices of the wider society” (Reicher 
et al., 2016, pp. 74–75). Finally, a leader must define a group and its values, 
not only to the outside world, but also in terms of mobilising the group itself; 
leaders have to be “entrepreneurs of identity” (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). This 
suggests that leadership is also about how the leader shapes the performance of 
the team or group as a whole—the leader has to give content to its social identity 
in order to make the group’s identity real. It is argued that this fourth dimension 
encompasses the effects of the other three (Reicher et al., 2016). 
Military Leadership
Whilst in contemporary leadership literature the examination of leadership as a 
social orientation is not a complete novelty, few studies into military leadership 
deviate from the traditional individualistic approach. Hence, studies of leadership 
in the military context tend to focus mainly on these individual leadership 
qualities (Atwater & Yammarinol, 1993). This is particularly remarkable if 
one understands the importance of comradeship and the team in any military 
structure. It has been confirmed that “in the extreme military context, it has been 
found that soldiers value their professional identity above other social identities” 
(Griffith, 2009, cited in Arnold et al., 2016, p. 7). Furthermore, Dave Grossman 
(2009) argues that men engaged in combat are usually not motivated to fight 
by ideology, hate or fear, but “by group pressures and processes involving 1) 
regard for their comrades, 2) respect for their leaders, 3) concern for their own 
reputation with both, and 4) an urge to contribute to the success of the group” 
(see also Janowitz, 1961; MacCoun, 2006; McPherson, 1997; Wong, 2003). 
Although military hierarchy formally arranges the relationship between leaders 
and followers, informally, platoon members are able to reject their leaders. This 
dismissal can create friction and counterproductive behaviour within military 
teams (Pierro, Cicero, Bonaiuto, van Knippenberg, & Kruglanski, 2005). Finally, 
in the military, the dynamic between commander and platoon might be considered 
even more important than in civilian organisations (Arnold et al., 2016), not least 
as it could become a matter of life and death. 
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Methodology
Single case study
In this article, we describe a qualitative single case study (Edwards, O’Mahoney, 
& Vincent, 2014; Yin, 2009) in which military leadership was not accepted. A 
commonly noted pitfall of single case studies is their lack of abstraction; the 
qualitative analysis of one case is not able to sufficiently provide evidence for 
scientific generalisations (Sayer, 2010; Yin, 2009). Nonetheless, Robert Yin 
(2009, pp. 47–50) argues that single case studies are an appropriate approach 
under four circumstances, namely “when it represents a critical case in testing a 
well-formulated theory . . .  ; an extreme case or a unique case . . . ; a representative 
or typical case . . . ; or a revelatory case ” (p.47- 48, italics in original). Two 
of these circumstances are relevant for this particular case study, and will be 
discussed below in greater detail. 
 In this article, a single case study is used for two reasons: the unique character 
of the case concerned; and because it can be considered a revelatory case, as 
few investigators have access to military contexts. Regarding the case study’s 
unique character, it is important to realise that in the Dutch context, military 
leaders are seldomly replaced during a mission. This is confirmed by military 
operational analysts working at the Defence Leadership Centre of Expertise; a 
department within the Dutch military. “There is one similar example that has 
been extensively discussed in the media, but there is hardly any literature or 
data on it” (commander ECLD, personal communication, June 18, 2018). 
Whilst a military operational analyst suggested: “This is highly unusual. In case 
of internal problems, more often someone lower in rank will be repatriated in 
order to save the career of the military leader in question” (operational analyst, 
personal communication, June 19, 2018). In the Netherlands, because of its 
sensitivity, aggregate data on this topic are either non-existent or not accessible. 
Such a lack of information makes this specific case “so rare that any single case 
is worth documenting and analysing” (Yin, 2009, p. 47). 
 However, there is more at stake. Kendra Koivu and Annika Hinze (2017) argue 
that, besides methodological concerns, the “human element of research” is of 
particular importance in case selection (p. 1025). To discuss this human element 
would support “the recent push for  transparency” in research and help “build 
methodological sophistication” (Koivu & Hinze, 2017, p. 1026). Therefore, 
and especially because entering the military community is considered rather 
difficult for civilian researchers (Dalenberg, 2017; Fosher, 2013), the position 
of the researcher and the case selection process cannot remain undiscussed. As 
the first author of this article, I am a civilian and a member of the research 
staff of the military academy in the Netherlands. My position at the Netherlands 
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Defence Academy made it possible “to study at first hand what people do and 
say” (Hammersley, 2006, p. 4, emphasis in original) in the particular context 
of Dutch military. After exhausting my existing network within the military 
organisation, I was allowed to join the platoon depicted in this case study to 
Afghanistan for a short period. Additionally, I could visit them twice during 
their pre-deployment preparations. The initial objective was to get a general idea 
of the practice of military leadership. However, once in Afghanistan, I learned 
about the unrest present in the platoon. Several platoon members expressed 
serious doubt concerning the leadership capabilities of the platoon commander 
(PC) and his successor. These doubts were not only shared with me on a personal 
level, but were also officially reported. Once back in the Netherlands, I stayed 
in touch with the platoon via social media. Within a week, I received the news 
that the PC was replaced, and that one of the soldiers had been repatriated. These 
developments placed my data in a new perspective, as these data were no longer 
able to give an adequate representation of operational military leadership, as was 
my initial intention. However, the problem was not the data itself; rather, the 
difficulty was to find an adequate framework to understanding what happened. 
The decision to analyse the case from a social identity perspective enabled me to 
gain insights into the conditions for accepting military leadership. The rationale 
behind this choice is the immanent importance (within the military organisation) 
of the dynamics between followers and their leader. Furthermore, this framework 
could shed light on the importance of contextual factors in military operations. 
Hence, this case study portrays a reconnaissance platoon deployed in Afghanistan 
who no longer accepted their commander. Half way through the mission, he was 
replaced. The rejection of his leadership functions as the starting point for this 
study, employing social identity theory as a framework for analysing leadership 
acceptance.
Background to the Case
For this case study we concentrated on a reconnaissance platoon deployed in 
Afghanistan in the winter of 2015–2016. Their specific assignment was to safely 
transport NATO military advisors to and from their appointments with local service 
men, government officials and other security professionals. During this mission, 
the PC—a first lieutenant—was responsible for the planning and coordination of 
the overall assignment. The platoon sergeant is his advisor and acts as the first 
point of contact for the rest of the platoon, consisting of four sergeants and 13 
soldiers and corporals. They fulfil three different roles: drivers, door gunners 
and guardian angels. Drivers prepare the vehicles and stay behind the wheel, 
whilst waiting for the NATO advisors. Door gunners maintain manually directed 
weapons aboard the vehicles and should—together with the drivers—make sure 
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the patrol is not interrupted whilst driving. Guardian angels walk the advisors to 
and from the vehicles to their appointments and secure the area. Each vehicle has 
a commander and, aside from the platoon and the political advisors, a medical 
vehicle accompanies the patrol every time they leave the camp. Outside of the 
base, all of the above fall under the platoon commander’s leadership, whilst inside 
the camp gates, only the platoon itself is his responsibility.
 Most of the platoon members had worked together for about two years in the 
Netherlands as a reconnaissance platoon, however, due to a variety of reasons, 
the composition of the platoon changed shortly before departure—two sergeants 
and several less experienced privates were added specifically for the mission. The 
young lieutenant was introduced to me by his commander as a rising star in the 
military, however, once in Afghanistan, things transpired rather differently. Before 
the end of the mission, he was replaced and one of his soldiers was repatriated to 
the Netherlands. It was these events that prompted this study to focus on why his 
leadership was not accepted. 
Data collection and analysis
Although an independent research project, this project was embedded in a 
regular research programme of the Dutch Ministry of Defence. A military 
organisational research unit was tasked to visit every mission halfway through 
their deployment and to perform a quantitative study regarding the morale of the 
soldiers concerned. For logistical reasons, the study presented in this article was 
embedded with this research unit. As the first author, I was invited as a researcher 
to Afghanistan to join the research unit for two weeks. Additionally, I met with 
the PC, encountered the platoon during the pre-deployment phase and upon their 
return. The narratives of these platoon members offered a unique understanding 
of the daily challenges of operational military leadership. The activities of this 
platoon, as observed during field research in Mazar-e-Sharif (Afghanistan), and 
the platoon members’ experiences and vision on leadership, conveyed through 
semi-structured interview sessions, form the input of this case study. 
 Following a communal breakfast in the international camp canteen, every day 
began with a field briefing, after which vehicles and weapons were prepared. 
Most days the platoon would leave the confines of the camp, however, for safety 
reasons, I could only join the platoon on a single field mission. The other days 
were spent inside the gates, either with members of the platoon who had some 
time off, or with the platoon’s superiors. Evenings were mostly spent together in 
the Dutch bar, either talking, playing table-tennis or cards, or watching a movie. 
As the Dutch base was relatively small, I had the opportunity to spend a lot of 
time with the platoon—in terms of official interviews, as well as in spare time 
and for the sharing of meals. 
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 Every member of the platoon was interviewed in the Dutch compound of the 
military base in Afghanistan. The platoon commander and his successor were 
interviewed individually twice, each lasting approximately one hour—once 
upon arrival and once before departure. Sergeants, corporals and soldiers were 
interviewed individually once and also in focus groups; two groups of soldiers, 
one group of corporals, and one group of sergeants. The group interviews lasted 
between 60 and 90 minutes and ten interviews in total were held. All interviews 
were recorded (audio only). The semi-structured interviews all followed the 
same format: a description of the daily activities of the respondents; zooming in 
on daily problems and challenges; and relating daily activities to leadership as 
experienced by the respondents. 
 Upon returning to the Netherlands, the audio files were transcribed and coded. 
To ensure anonymity, all respondents were given identification numbers—such 
as 3.15 or 6.18—in which the first number refers to the chronological order of 
when the interview was held, and the second to the respondent. Only where 
informative, are ranks mentioned. The interview data were complemented with 
personal observations and additional conversations—both with members of the 
platoon and other Dutch military personnel present at the compound. Furthermore, 
field notes and internal documents were used for background information. 
 The transcribed interviews were coded with the help of ATLAS.ti8. For analysis, 
we used techniques of selective and open coding. Open coding means that the data 
were analysed without the use of pre-identified theoretical concepts (Friese, 2014; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This is an iterative process, which led to the identification 
of a wide diversity of codes, (sub)categories, notes on the use of language, possible 
underlying mechanisms and mapping between codes. Early in the process, we 
worked with 56 individual codes, including codes on the preparatory phase, self-
reflection of the interviewees, external threats and cooperation with other nations. 
Later in the process, patterns emerged, mainly with regard to more internally 
oriented social processes, such as team composition, preparation time and task 
orientation. The overarching question behind the selective codification of the 
interviews with the platoon members was: Can social identity theory explain 
the undesirable dynamics between the platoon commander and his platoon? For 
selective coding, we mainly relied on the four dimensions of leadership in terms of 
social identity theory, as identified by Reicher et al. (2016). These four dimensions 
provided the framework within which we sought to understand why, in this case, 
leadership was not accepted. As such, this case study offers a unique understanding 
of the daily—sometimes banal and mundane—challenges of operational military 
leadership. In presenting the data, we first focus on the results of selective coding. 
Subsequently, in the analysis, we use the results of open codification to give greater 
depth to the discussion. 
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Unaccepted Leadership: The Platoon’s Perspective
Regarding the first dimension of the framework developed by Reicher et al. 
(2016)—i.e., act as one of us—the interview data revealed a strong tendency for 
placing the PC in the out-group, rather than as part of their in-group. “I feel that 
the PC and platoon sergeant are participating, but not for real. That’s my feeling” 
(respondent 6.15). Also on a personal level, platoon members reported a certain 
distance: “Our PC doesn’t do social talk with us. Since we arrived here he has not 
asked once how I’m doing” (respondent 7.20). Respondent 3.4 elaborates on the 
feeling of distance: “We are soldiers, he is a ‘jeans-officer.’” “Jeans-officer” is a 
term used among privates and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to frame young 
officers as inexperienced “elite-boys” from the military academy. Respondent 
3.4: “If you pretend, with only six years of service, that you know it all, then 
you’re a big cheat, seriously. It is a life-threatening mistake.” Furthermore, the 
platoon judged him as being too stressed: “Our leader always shows his stress, 
this is not good” (respondent 6.17). When asked for further clarification, it was 
explained that a reconnaissance soldier should not exhibit stress, especially if he 
is the leader of the group. Another private said: “We know what we have to do, 
each one of us is just doing his work. As long as things go well, he has nothing to 
do” (respondent 7.18). These quotes indicate that, whilst the PC is tolerated, he 
is not considered an essential element in the performance of the platoon.
 Following the four dimensions outlined by Reicher et al. (2016), secondly, a 
leader needs to “act for us”. The platoon, and in particular the NCOs, believed 
that the PC was mainly pursuing his own career. “He uses the platoon to show 
off towards his own superiors. . . . I feel that his only vision is about making 
a good impression in order to pursue his own career” (respondent 3.4). It was 
claimed that the PC took on extra assignments, such as making pictures for the 
intelligence department and giving tours to high-ranking visitors, without taking 
the safety of his own men into consideration: 
If you use the platoon as an extension of yourself by ordering them to take 
pictures of a whole complex. . . . He uses the platoon as a means, instead of 
having the goal of making the platoon function perfectly. (respondent 3.4)
Platoon members suggested that on different occasions, the PC was not concerned 
enough about their safety. He neglected basic drills: “Basic military agreements 
are ignored. . . . [C]onsequently, he creates unsafe situations” (respondent 3.3). 
The third dimension was coined by Reicher et al. (2016) as “collective self-
realisation”. Within this dimension, the most serious grievance was that the PC 
did not make enough use of the knowledge and experience within the platoon, 
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nor of a previous deployment. He was said to have refused support from the 
previous deployment and wanted to do it all by himself: “He was busy buying 
a house and therefore missed the opportunity to visit Afghanistan in advance” 
(respondent 3.4). Additionally, some members conveyed they felt he was unable 
“to take them along in the story, and the assignment” (respondent 4.8). The same 
respondent also suggested that the PC decided on things, and gave orders, instead 
of sharing the “why behind a certain order” (respondent 4.8). 
 Finally, comprising the other three dimensions, the fourth dimension outlined 
by Reicher et al. (2016) is “entrepreneurship of identity”. Their theory prescribes 
that leaders must define a group and its values—not only to the outside world, 
but also in terms of mobilising the group itself (Reicher et al., 2016). The platoon 
judged the PC to have neither of these qualities and, although some men showed 
understanding for the PC’s position in the organisation—“he is being addressed 
and criticised every time we do something against the rules, even when he can’t 
help it” (respondent 5.13)—the final judgement of the platoon was negative. On 
several aspects, the PC was considered to be out-group, rather than in-group. He 
was trained at the elite military academy and thus considered to be part of the 
officer-body, rather than a “real” reconnaissance soldier. Additionally, he had 
hired “newbie”, rather than experienced soldiers. He was suspected of acting 
out of self-interest, rather than for the platoon, and did not listen sufficiently to 
the existing experience within the platoon. In other words, the PC was unable to 
fulfil the platoon members’ needs to shape and strengthen their group identity. 
The platoon attributed these shortcomings in terms of leadership to their PC on 
a personal level. It was collectively established that he was not prototypical, 
and thus did not manage to be an in-group leader, let alone an “entrepreneur of 
identity”. This negative judgment only increases as he fails to show in-group 
favouritism. 
 Thus, based on the four dimensions outlined by Reicher et al. (2016), the 
findings seem to show that the lack of leadership acceptance should be attributed 
to a failing leader. However, being replaced whilst on a mission is quite unusual 
(Vogelaar & Dalenberg, 2012). Hence, simply framing the PC as an inadequate 
leader is not sufficient to understand the social dynamics within the group that 
led to his replacement. Through open codification, we identified additional 
factors expressed by the respondents that were experienced as a threat to the 
social identity of the platoon, and that could explain the spiralling negativity of 
in-group dynamics. These factors appeared to be contextual rather than personal 
(meaning they can be attributed neither personally to the PC, nor to the platoon), 
but nevertheless they seemed to have a decisive impact on the course of events. 
In the following, we discuss the three factors that came out strongest in open 
codification: team composition; preparation time; and task uncertainty.
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Contextual Factors and the Black Sheep Effect
Firstly, regarding team composition, sergeants, corporals and privates alike 
expressed that they felt a lack of unity, ascribing this mostly to how the platoon 
was assembled, at least in part, on an ad-hoc base. One corporal commented: “The 
team is different than usual. We have to work with all new and unexperienced 
soldiers, while we normally only work with experienced guys, and [name old 
sergeant] is missing” (respondent 4.7). Respondents 6.15, 6.16, and 6.17 also 
felt that the situation was not normal. Private 1: “It is rather weird. There is one 
sergeant who leaves. And then, three others leave as well.” Private 2: “Actually, 
there is only one sergeant staying.” Private 3: “It’s all a bit make-do and mend.” 
Private 2 added: “They are all temps, and together we try to make the best of it.” 
Based on these comments, and the fact that the platoon was assembled, at least 
partially, in an ad-hoc manner, it seems reasonable to assume that the team’s 
composition was an undermining factor in this mission. 
 Secondly, collective preparation time was experienced as limited. A private 
explained: 
After the summer we all went to individual training institutes. Drivers went to 
Germany, gunners went to Germany, guardian angels to Hilversum [a town in the 
Netherlands]. We only had from August till November. From those months you 
had to spend one and a half maybe two months on individual training. And in the 
remaining time the gunners were somewhere else for quite a while. So effectively 
we had less than two months to prepare together. (respondent 7.19)
This assessment was confirmed by other platoon members. Getting the 
appropriate driving licences and updating technical knowledge were considered 
more important than investing time in team cohesion. These technical trainings 
are usually job specific and, as such, an individual enterprise, rather than 
representing a training opportunity for the whole platoon. 
 Thirdly, platoon members felt that the type of assignment was not in line 
with their reconnaissance identity.1 The assignment for this mission was 
considered simple and labelled as a low-threat assignment. We coded this as task 
uncertainty, because the platoon felt that they could not do the type of work they 
were trained for. One respondent illustrated this clearly: “We are actually a recon 
[i.e. reconnaissance] platoon, but do simple force protection work” (respondent 
1 Reconnaissance soldiers are usually more experienced than regular infantry soldiers. They operate 
under more complex circumstances, and in smaller teams, trained to operate in life-threatening 
circumstances.
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3.4). Others agreed: “I’ve had exercises with reconnaissance elements that were 
more exciting” (respondent 5.13); and “We are soldiers, but stay in when there is 
a threat, while we are trained for combat” (respondent 4.8).
 We consider these three contextual factors as presenting structural risks to the 
acceptance of (military) leadership. These contextual factors suggest that this 
reconnaissance platoon felt they had been placed in a position in which, because 
of their mandate, they could not live up to what they considered to be prototypical 
of their group. They had to execute (for them) relatively unfamiliar tasks, with 
a rather new team, under different circumstances than they were trained for, and 
they experienced a lack of preparation time. Michael Glennon (2015) confirms 
the importance of contextual factors, and connects the institutional practices to 
underlying frustrations (2015, 19-28). 
 Moreover, these contextual factors suggest there was a mismatch been 
training and work. Not only was the PC himself unable to life up to the image 
of the military leader, that he and his seniors had developed of him during 
and after military education. Also the soldiers and non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) could not re-assure their own image of being a reconnaissance soldier. 
Neither the task, nor the team were considered prototypical of their identity as a 
reconnaissance platoon. This posed a threat to the team members’ social identity. 
 In addition, these in-group dynamics were not moderated by active 
entrepreneurship of social identity on the part of the PC. Jan Stets and Peter 
Burke (2000) explain that through self-categorisation, individuals accentuate 
perceived similarities between themselves and other in-group members, whilst 
accentuating differences between themselves and out-group members. In this 
case, we see that the platoon commander was increasingly seen as an out-group 
member. This situation eventually caused the social dynamics of the group to 
turn against him. 
 This situation might be explained using an additional theoretical framework, 
namely the “black sheep effect” as described by Isabel Pinto, Jose Marques, John 
Levine, and Dominic Abrams (2010). The black sheep effect explains how the 
responses of in-group members to the deviant behaviour of an in-group member 
are more severe than that of an out-group member who shows similar behaviour. 
According to this theory, the deviance of an in-group member will trigger a 
“prescriptive focus” that drives group members to evaluate the deviant member 
in terms of his or her contribution to the superior identity of the in-group members 
(Pinto et al., 2010, p. 107). This effect is more prevalent when the social identity 
of the group needs validation (due to threats to this identity; Pinto et al., 2010, 
p. 108). The deviance of in-group members undermines the distinctiveness of 
the group, and therefore poses a direct threat to in-group identity. In addition, 
research has shown that group members tend to judge deviant group members 
91
Study 3  Leadership Acceptance
more strongly when they feel other members hold them accountable for their 
judgement as group members (Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada, 
1998). These mechanisms are clearly recognisable in this case study. 
 In this case, the combined influence of threats to the reconnaissance platoon’s 
identity and distinctiveness (e.g., new members that were not considered 
prototypical, and a task that was not in line with their reconnaissance identity) 
and the behaviour of the lieutenant as deviant from group norms (e.g., “not acting 
as one of us”; no small talk; ignoring protocol; showing his stress) may have 
resulted in increased scrutiny of the PC’s behaviour. This scrutiny was, amongst 
others, characterised by the paying of a disproportion amount of attention to the 
PC’s behaviour, which was deemed to be undermining the reconnaissance identity 
of the group (e.g., not using the experience within the group and accepting just 
any task).
 In the end, this scrutiny led to more unfavourable judgement by the 
NCOs compared to the privates. Whilst the privates were unhappy about the 
situation, they reacted with more equanimity. However, the NCOs focused all 
their negative attributions on the PC’s behaviour and his person, rather than 
on contextual factors or the defence organisation, which could be considered 
equally (or perhaps even more) responsible. This might be explained by their 
roles in the unit. The NCOs were seen—and saw themselves—as keepers of the 
group’s identity and protectors of group norms: “[I]t is us, the sergeants, who 
keep things going and keep the platoon together, to come across as a unity for 
outsiders” (respondent 3.4). The lack of entrepreneurship of the social identity by 
the PC was compensated for by the NCOs. First of all, the NCOs are considered 
responsible for the socialisation of new group members, as they are generally the 
most experienced (and therefore most prototypical) group members. Moreover, 
the NCOs are supposed to support and protect the PC’s leadership by adhering 
and explaining his decisions to the group. However, as the PC in their view was 
acting against the group’s interest, they could only dismiss his leadership to 
protect their own prototypicality. This responsibility may have enhanced their 
perceived accountability towards the group and therefore led to an even stronger 
prescriptive focus or, in other words, a tendency to judge the PC’s behaviour 
only in terms of deviance towards the group’s identity. 
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Conclusion
Building on the experiences of a Dutch reconnaissance platoon in Afghanistan, 
this article aimed to understand military leadership acceptance by focusing on 
social dynamics in relation to leadership acceptance. Secondly, it studied the 
potential of social identity theory as a framework within which to analyse 
leadership. Regarding military leadership, it can be concluded that simply 
dismissing individual leadership qualities can take us towards an explanation but 
does not do justice to the complexity of the case study. The analysis of interview 
data from a social identity theory perspective gave a more precise explanation of 
why the privates and NCOs judged their leader to be inadequate.
 The findings provide some preliminary evidence to show that paying insufficient 
attention to in-group dynamics and entrepreneurship might undermine leadership 
acceptance—both in the context of military platoons, and quite possibly other team 
situations. The effect of this lack of attention is intensified when contextual threats 
to social identity are present, and others in the team feel responsible for acting in an 
entrepreneurial way regarding the team’s social identity. As such, the combination 
of (lacking) leadership behaviour, contextual circumstances and the characteristics 
of his followers led to the dismissal of this military leader. The analysis, focusing 
on group dynamics, in fact showed that individual behaviour is just one of many 
factors. These insights could be of importance in pre-deployment training for 
military leaders. It might suggest that the current focus on the development of 
individual leadership qualities and ignorance of the importance of context and in-
group dynamics, fails to adequately prepare military leaders for their work as team 
leaders. 
 Although this is a single-case study, and we would not want to generalize 
beyond the case, this study’s findings relate positively to established literature 
and as such, can provide preliminary evidence that social identity theory can be 
a useful instrument for analysing in-group dynamics with regard to leadership. 
In line with Van Knippenberg et al. (2005) and Hogg (2016), we suggest that 
social identity theory can fill a gap in current research on leadership and can be 
used to explain the acceptance (or not) of leaders in groups. The contribution of 
this study to existing literature on social identity theory is that it illustrates how 
entrepreneurship of identity emerges in the in-group. It demonstrates how a lack 
of attention to group dynamics may damage the reputation of the leader, and 
create the need for “in-group entrepreneurship”, which places an extra burden 
on official leadership. The results of the case study might suggest that elements 
of social identity theory can, apart from analysing leadership patterns, also be 
an instrument for analysing in-group dynamics with regard to leadership. Based 
on the principles of social identity theory, this study suggests that a combination 
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of the context and the type of leadership might create a dynamic that can lead 
to “leader-undermining entrepreneurship”—i.e., team members who are more 
prototypical than the leader may undermine official leadership. 
  In conclusion, in this case, social identity theory proved to be a useful 
framework for analysing the acceptance of leadership, as it moves beyond the 
individual characteristics of the leader, addresses contextual influences and 
considers leadership acceptance as a dynamic process. As such, social identity 
theory explained how dynamics between leaders and followers influenced the 
acceptance of leadership in this particular situation. Possibly, social identity 
theory can be a suitable approach for analysing the acceptance of military leaders 
in other situations as well. Furthermore, this case study demonstrates how a 
lack of attention to group processes can damage a carefully prepared operation. 
Finally, the use of social identity theory as an explanatory framework highlights 
the perspective of the followers, rather than the behaviour of the individual 
leader. As few studies in the military realm acknowledge leadership as a social 
orientation, this is a refreshing approach. 
 However, the framework of social identity theory failed to give a satisfactory 
explanation for why followers—in this case, particular NCOs—turned against 
their leader. In a secondary analysis, we therefore focused on in-group dynamics, 
and in particular the behaviour of these NCOs. The open coding provided 
additional information on contextual factors and sketched a different picture. A 
PC was sent on a mission with a platoon that had been assembled ad hoc, and 
without sufficient time to prepare, to complete an assignment that was outside 
of their core expertise. These findings suggest the insufficiency of focusing on 
leadership behaviour alone, as contextual factors also drive in-group dynamics, 
spiralling into a situation in which leadership acceptance is no longer a given. 
Therefore, in a secondary analysis, we connected these findings with literature 
on the so-called “black sheep effect” (Pinto et al., 2010). The NCOs in this case 
practised their own entrepreneurship, and as such, dismissed the leadership of 
the PC. Thus, whereas Reicher et al. (2005) describe the importance of being an 
entrepreneur for the group’s social identity, the black sheep effect reveals how an 
inability to do so can create a negative environment for leadership acceptance.
Research Limitations and Future Research
Whilst offering several interesting insights regarding leadership acceptance 
and the use of social identity theory within a military context, there are several 
limitations to this study. Following Yin (2009), we used the single case study 
approach, as it can provide valuable insights into the mechanisms of leadership 
acceptance in an actual work context. However, case studies in general, and 
single case studies in particular, can suffer from a lack of generalisability. 
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Therefore, conclusions should be drawn with caution. Future investigations, 
either through the use of additional case studies or a more quantitative approach, 
can be employed to corroborate these findings.
 In addition, the current study focused on leadership dynamics in small units. 
It remains to be seen whether these findings also apply to larger units and 
upper-echelon leadership. However, we do believe that it is useful to examine 
the leadership dynamics of a small unit such as a platoon, because small unit 
leadership is becoming ever more important as fewer soldiers are tasked with 
(and can do) much more with the contemporary technologies now at their 
disposal. Concluding, we underline that more research into leadership-follower 
dynamics in small groups, both qualitatively and quantitatively, would be pivotal 
for military practice in future operations.  
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Complexity and Uncertainty 
A Discrepancy in Military Organisation? 
This chapter has been accepted for publication as: 
Jansen, M. M. (in press). Complexity and uncertainty: A discrepancy in the military 
organisation? In A. Pulkka & S. Paananen (Eds.), Processes and practices in military 
education and training. Helsinki: National Defence University. 
Abstract
“With military precision” is not simply just another expression or soundbite. It 
refers to probably the best-known characteristics of an army: its order, structure 
and hierarchy. Yet, an equally applicable observation on military practice is its 
dynamic, complex environment. Both statements might be considered truisms, 
perhaps even a little cliché. Based on extensive fieldwork in the Dutch military 
itself as well as theories on dealing with uncertainty, this article aims to investigate 
how the contradiction between standardisation and uncertainty is experienced in 
the Dutch military. From an ethnographic point of view, it is interesting to notice 
that the rhetoric of the military and its personnel focuses on the complexities of 
military work—the importance of flexibility in unknown circumstances—whilst 
their daily routine mainly concentrates on processes of standardisation. Although 
the co-existence of processes of standardisation and an uncertain environment is 
not in itself problematic, it does include some pertinent risks for an organisation 
operating in insecure environments. In conclusion, it is questioned to what extent 
the existence of multiple military realities should be acknowledged in military 
education, because the challenge of preparing cadets for dual realities—for 
complexity and uncertainty on the one hand, and well-ordered professionalism on 
the other—requires more than simply allowing them to deal with the paradox. 
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Introduction
War, civil unrest, and almost all conflict situations are by their very nature “messy” 
affairs, not only for the warring parties and the people caught up in them, but also 
for those reacting to such crises—not least, military personnel. As has become 
well-established since the end of the Cold War, the global security landscape has 
changed drastically, and it is widely acknowledged that contemporary military 
and peacekeeping missions have become increasingly complex (Beebe & Kaldor, 
2010; Chandler, 2012; Collier, 2003; Crocker, 2007; Frerks, 2007; Singer, 2009; 
Ul Haq, 1995; UNDP, 1994). Notable works detailing these developments are 
Mary Kaldor’s (2007) famous intervention on the difference between “new” and 
“old” wars, or analyses of UN peacekeeping missions in the 1990s (Easterly, 
2006; Meisler, 2007; Rubinstein, 2015; Schnabel, 2001; UNDP, 1994). More 
recent studies argue that “multilateral peace operations are increasingly 
confronting a set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing security challenges 
that . . . have causes and effects which cut right across the international security, 
peacebuilding and development agendas” (Van der Lijn, 2018, p. 1). Whilst Jair 
van der Lijn focuses here on UN peacekeeping operations only, NATO (2018) 
acknowledges that “[t]oday, the Alliance is faced with a security environment 
that is more diverse, complex, fast moving and demanding than at any time 
since its inception”, (p. 1). Clearly, military practice is characterised by dynamic 
complexity—the unknown nature and uncertainty of the working environment. 
 At the same time, military service is characterised by protocols, doctrines 
and standardisation (Posen, 2016). Michele Chwastiak (2006) refers in this 
respect to “US war managers” (p. 51) and “cause-effect war” (p. 37) in order 
to describe the bureaucratic aspects of the Vietnam war. Some studies claim 
that there is “an increasingly obvious discrepancy between the high complexity 
and interdependence of conflict, and a comparably under-complex strategy 
and toolbox used to handle this complexity properly” (Ropers, Korppen, & 
Giessmann, 2011, p. 7). 
 Both the military’s internal bureaucracy and the increasing complexity of 
the world in which it operates have been extensively discussed by scholars 
and practitioners alike. However, most studies focus either on the uncertainty 
of the complex environment of military practice, or concentrate solely on the 
bureaucratic characteristics of the military, which are characterised by processes 
of standardisation. The aim of this article is to investigate how this contradiction 
is experienced within the Dutch military and, in conclusion, to assess the 
consequences for military education. 
 The article starts with a discussion of existing literature on uncertainty and 
standardisation in military practice. This analysis is used to clearly define 
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and situate the above contradiction between complexity and standardisation. 
Subsequently, the process of data collection and analysis are discussed. The 
analysis, based on organisational theories on how to deal with uncertainty, 
suggests that, whilst using a rhetoric of uncertainty, the military is still 
predominantly focused on standardisation. Finally, the article reflects upon the 
contradictions present in military practice, and the consequences for military 
education. Rather than intending to be conclusive, this article aims to serve as an 
invitation for further research into the implications of contradictory elements in 
military practice, and their consequences for military education. 
Methodological Design
Data collection and analysis
Data were collected during four years of field research from 2014 to 2018. 
During these four years, one observation consistently seemed of particular 
importance, namely, the tension between the standardisation of the work on the 
one hand, and the uncertainty and complexity of the working environment on 
the other. This apparent contradiction became the starting point for this article. 
All interviews, which were recorded and transcribed, took place in the working 
environments of the participants. The interviews lasted between 60 and 90 
minutes. All participants were male and aged between 17 and 37. Participants 
were asked to describe their daily chores, talk about their military education, 
and reflect on their work. Participants were made aware that their stories would 
be processed anonymously and used for scientific research only. All participants 
gave oral consent.
 The data presented in this study are part of a PhD research that was designed 
based on the principles of informed grounded theory (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2015; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Perry & Kempster, 2014).1 Unlike classic grounded 
theory, informed grounded theory specifically encourages the use of pre-existing 
literature and theories as a means by which to both understand the empirical 
material at hand, and support the analysis of the phenomena observed (Parry 
1 The PhD study focuses solely on male infantry officers. Until recently, infantry was a male-only 
service in the Dutch military. The study is divided into two parts. The first part is an ethnography 
of military education at the Netherlands Defence Academy (see Jansen & Kramer, 2018). The 
second part studies the operational context. Semi-structured interviews were held with 19 
members of an infantry platoon in Afghanistan over a period of two weeks. This resulted in a case 
study on military leadership (see Jansen & Delahaij, 2019). Data regarding the domestic military 
environment were gathered via semi-structured interviews conducted with nine infantry officers 
over a period of six months.
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& Kempster, 2014, pp. 86–87; Thornberg, 2012).2 The analysis in this article is 
supported by a conceptual framework based on existing theories from Gareth 
Morgan (2006), and Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe (2007), both of which 
examine how organisations deal with uncertainty. This guiding framework helps 
to make sense of the collected data and to focus, not only on the experiences 
of the Dutch servicemen themselves, but also to connect their experiences to 
underlying organisational mechanisms of the Dutch military, specifically with 
regard to organising uncertainty. 
Organising uncertainty
Organisations have dealt with uncertainty in many different ways. Generally 
speaking, there are three fundamentally different perspectives in organisational 
theory concerned with dealing with uncertainty: classic organisation theory; an 
open system approach; and self-referential organisations (Morgan, 2006). The 
three perspectives are summarised in Table 1, which will serve as the guiding 
framework in the analysis and discussion, and is explained underneath. 
Reducing uncertainty by Internal organisational 
design for dealing with 
uncertainty
Classic organisational 
theory
creating and maintaining 
stability and predictability
top-down design of control 
loops
Open system approach “absolute” adaptation aimed at maximum variation 
and adaptability
Self-referential 
organisations 
bounded or selective 
adaption 
aspects of design influence 
“self-organisation”
Table 1: Organisational Design and Dealing with Uncertainty3 
Firstly, in classic organisational theory, the system is oriented towards internal 
stability. Organisations within this paradigm understand management as a 
“process of planning, organization, command, coordination and control” (Morgan, 
2006, p. 18). There will be defined lines of communication, mostly represented in 
2 Grounded theory was developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) as a method for 
conducting qualitative research, in reaction to the dominant tradition of positivist and deductive 
social research. Its central tenet is that research starts from data, rather than theory. “By adopting 
grounded theory methods you can direct, manage and streamline your data collection and, moreover, 
construct an original analysis of your data” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 2).
3 Adapted from Moorkamp (2017, p. 30), based on studies from Blom (1997) and Morgan (2011, pp. 
11–26).
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“classic” organisational charts. Work is structured, and employees are understood 
as parts of the “machine”. The management of uncertainty is expected to come 
from “numerous control loops” (Moorkamp, 2017, p. 27) and “compliance to a 
prescribed code” (Blom, 1997, p. 14). Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) argue that in such 
organisations “unexpected events can get them into trouble. When people form 
expectations, they assume that certain sequences of actions are likely to happen” 
(p. 41). Secondly, an open system approach stands in stark contrast to classic 
organisational theory. In this perspective the environment is a given, in which the 
organisation is an organism, rather than a machine (Morgan, 2006, pp. 11–64). 
Hence, the organisation will aim to adjust itself completely to its environment. 
Making changes within the system is not problematic for these organisations, as 
they will try to vary and adapt themselves to uncertainty. Thirdly, the perspective 
of self-referential organisations falls somewhere between the classic and the open 
approaches. These organisations are based on principles of selective adaptation 
(Blom, 1997). This perspective advocates a certain level of “closedness”, and 
generally, their organisational design both enables and restricts an organisation’s 
options to adapt to environmental demands (Blom, 1997). The question within 
this perspective is when to adapt, and when to stay put. 
Uncertainty and Standardisation in Theory
The underlying premise for this article is that there is a contradiction between the 
uncertainty and chaos of war, and the military’s preference for standardisation. 
This is not a new concern for armies– much military theory is to devise means for 
overcoming the chaos by means of imposing routines on soldiers. Strategic theory 
from Von Clausewitz (1984) onwards considers the nature of the chaos. Military 
organisations must deal with high levels of uncertainty (Posen, 2016, p. 172). Some 
of this uncertainty stems from the international political environment (NATO, 
2018; van der Lijn, 2018), whilst still more arises at an individual level: “The 
modern soldier is no longer simply a warrior: he (or she) is at once a peacekeeper, 
diplomat, leader, sibling and friend” (Beard, 2014, p. 274). Research by Wendy 
Broesder, Tessa op den Buijs, Ad Vogelaar and Martin Euwema (2015) confirms 
that soldiers struggle with these multiple identities. Additionally, soldiers are 
trained to handle confrontation—large scale violations of human rights, political 
complexity, flagrant injustices, poverty, death and disease, (sexual) abuse and an 
enemy who, most of the time, cannot be distinguished from the civilian population 
(Kaldor, 2007; Paris & Sisk, 2009). Significantly, the perpetrators of such conflicts 
do not behave according to the same rules as military personnel (de Graaff, Schut, 
Verweij, Vermetten, & Giebels, 2016). 
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Furthermore, due to developments in (social) media, military operations and 
actions within these operations have become subject to extreme levels of scrutiny 
and exposure. Meanwhile, public and political opinion regarding military 
missions can quickly change. Instead of returning as a hero, the soldier might 
equally have become an example of national shame. The cases of Srebrenica 
(van Baarda & Verweij, 2006; Blocq, 2006) and Abu Ghraib (Giroux, 2004) 
are exemplary here. Whilst the complexities of operating in such conditions are 
widely acknowledged and might even be considered to have become largely 
taken for granted, simultaneously, the bureaucratic nature of the military is 
equally widely observed. The complexity of such situations contrasts starkly 
with the way in which military organisations are designed. 
 Historically, a typical military organisational design is mechanical. Gareth 
Morgan (2006) traces the particular mechanistic world design back to the time of 
Frederick the Great (1712–1786), who “introduced many reforms that actually 
served to reduce his soldiers to automatons . . . Frederick’s aim was to shape 
the army into an efficient mechanism operating through means of standardized 
parts” (p. 16). In a similar vein, in Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault 
(1977) argues that
the ideal figure of the soldier . . . [in the seventeenth century] bore certain signs 
. . . By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be 
made; out of a formless clay . . . the machine required can be constructed. (p. 135) 
In fact, Frederick the Great’s vision of a mechanised army gradually became 
the blueprint for modern society, as well as the operating basis for factories and 
offices. Referring to Max Weber’s “proliferation of bureaucratic forms”, David 
Graeber (2015) coined the term “total bureaucratization” in order to refer to the 
perverse logic of bureaucracy. He explains: “If you create a bureaucratic structure 
to deal with some problem, that structure will invariably end up creating other 
problems that seem as if they, too, can only be solved by bureaucratic means” 
(Graeber, 2015, pp. 149–150). Eric Hans Kramer (2007) elaborates: “When one 
cuts a process into pieces, one inevitably needs glue to put it together again. This 
glue can for example take the form of rules” (p. 119). This type of organisational 
design remains the blueprint for most military organisations (Posen, 2016; 
Soeters, Winslow, & Weibull, 2006). 
 The observation of the contradiction between the widely acknowledged 
complexity of operating in crisis situations on the one hand, and the pervasiveness 
of the bureaucratic way in which the military is organised on the other, is in 
itself hardly ground-breaking. As Martin van Creveld (1985) argues, military 
organisations have struggled with this contradiction since Roman times, in the 
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sense that large-scale military operations are seldom flexible in their scope. 
Military personnel often have to carry out tasks in a “dynamically complex 
environment” (Kramer, 2007, pp. 24–27), whilst “the military has emerged as a 
prototype of the mechanistic organization” (Morgan, 2006, p. 16).  
 How servicemen and -women experience this contradiction in their daily 
work has not received much attention. This study aims to fill that gap. As 
Anders Sookermany (2017) explains, “[i]t is commonly accepted that the nature 
of military operations is one of such character that no matter how well you 
prepare, there will still be an expectation of having to deal with the unknown and 
unforeseen” (p. 310). The question is how this might be achieved. 
Uncertainty and Standardisation in Practice
This section aims to illustrate the contradictory nature of the military environment 
by showing the two faces of military practice (uncertainty and standardisation), 
using excerpts from interviews with officers and cadets on how they experience 
life in the Dutch military. In order to give greater perspective on the individual 
experiences presented, where necessary, further context is provided. The 
following presentation of the data starts with an introductory paragraph detailing 
the education received by military infantry officers at the Netherlands Defence 
Academy and concludes with a description of military practice. 
 In the description of the military academy, two examples are given. One is 
a description of the first day of training for a new batch of infantry cadets; the 
second is an example of military education described as a mechanical process. In 
this second part on military practice, examples are given from the domestic and 
expeditionary environment.
Military Academy
The official narrative of the Netherlands Defense Academy (NLDA) is that 
they “educate the leaders of the future” (Dalenberg, Folkerts, & Bijlsma, 2014, 
n.p.).4 The NLDA emphasises the importance of a broad education and academic 
knowledge for officers. They do not strive to teach precisely what to do when 
working as an officer, but rather aim “to build character” (Dalenberg et al., 2014, 
38,). This narrative emphasises both authenticity and complexity. Dutch military 
education is characterised by a hierarchal educational style, learning to take 
orders, and gaining knowledge of rules and procedures. Mechanistic structures 
4  A detailed overview of life and study at this institute can be found in Dalenberg (2017); Groen and 
Klinkert (2003); Jansen and Kramer (2018).
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in military education control how personnel dress, when they eat, when they 
engage in sporting activities, and when they work. 
 The following notes, which I made on the day that a new intake started their 
education, are rather characteristic:
Still wearing civilian clothing, they have to stand in formation; in order of length, 
in four rows, an arm’s length apart, badge on the left. Because they all arrive 
at different moments, it takes long. Very long. I am told 80% of military life is 
waiting. They are patient, and expectant. After a while they start marching. Their 
movements seem unfamiliar. They get their lunch packages. They still call it lunch 
package, soon it will be shortened to “lupa”. After lunch, a long lecture follows 
on their rights and obligations as servicemen. The lecture is filled with military 
jargon. I observe a certain schizoid character in these lectures. They are all about 
being authentic and pro-active, while the same PowerPoint presentation is used 
every semester. There is hardly time for questions, but most things are repeated 
at least twice. Whilst I am noting this all down, outside in the sun, the first newly 
formed platoon exits the building. “Group ‘Bravo’ here,” they shout, and find their 
places in the formation quickly. (field notes, August 2015, Breda, the Netherlands)
I am not the only one to have made these observations. Giuseppe Caforio (2006) 
argues that “procedures are used in order to induce strong normative compliance, 
such as community life, discipline, emphasized hierarchical order, rules for public 
and private behavior, and a system of sanctions” (pp. 255–256). In the context of 
the US military, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Doty and Major Walter Sowden (2009) 
describe how the army designs education in “a compartmentalized manner”:
This is evident as you examine unit-training schedules. We refer to classes . . . as 
mandatory or chain teaching. To execute this training, . . . “canned” PowerPoint 
slide decks [are issued]. . . . Once the training is complete, the “block” is checked 
and the unit moves on to the next task. (p. 70)
In accordance with the above, most of the instructors I met in the Netherlands 
talked about the educational system as a set of neatly segmented processes and 
are thus likely to show organograms and schematic PowerPoints, representing 
causal relations in learning processes. 
 I now turn to the second example, namely, military education as a mechanic 
process. From the very start, the selection process is characterised by a duality 
between standardisation and apparent arbitrariness. Before being admitted to 
the academy, aspirant officers are interviewed and tested for their IQ, physical 
fitness and psychological health. The primary instruments for selection are 
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standardised tests, and a confidential form on which a number of the cadet’s key 
dispositions are divided into many boxes and predefined questions. However, 
despite these tested methods and instruments, the military psychologist who 
welcomed me to the selection center elaborated: “In fact, the AAC [Acceptance 
and Advice Commission] is the most important. They give a binding advice 
whether to hire someone or not. And their process is a black-box” (psychologist, 
personal communication, June 10, 2015). However, the AAC, which is chaired 
by a retired colonel, disagrees with the psychologist’s assertion, and told me 
that they function as a “machine bureaucracy” (Colonel, chair of the Acceptance 
and Advice Commission, personal communication, October 29, 2015). The 
metaphor used by the colonel is not unique: instructors and cadets alike often 
talk about themselves in metaphors such as “products” and “manufacturing”. As 
a further example, a course instructor (a sergeant) talks about his work in factory 
metaphors: “the military academy does not produce officers, but makes semi-
manufactured products, the technical training is responsible for the next step in 
line” (field notes, November 2014, Breda, the Netherlands).
 Nevertheless, the “assembly line” is considered far from perfect by those 
responsible for “operating” it. Instructors at the Netherlands Defence Academy 
and the technical infantry training all share the feeling that they constantly have to 
“unlearn” that which was previously taught, either at high school, at university, or 
sometimes even at other military units: “We first have to unlearn whatever they did 
before, and we will teach them how it really works,” explains an instructor at the 
military academy (Captain, personal communication, 2015). A major, responsible 
for the technical training of the cadets following their education at the Netherlands 
Defence Academy, explains: 
My biggest challenge is to break down the habits they learned at the military 
academy. What they have built up during those years in Breda, has to be broken 
down. They will soon find themselves in a completely different world. (Major, 
personal communication, October 6, 2016)
This “completely different world” has at least two contexts: the domestic, and 
the expeditionary military environments. In the following section, I give a few 
examples from the Afghanistan case study, and from interviews conducted 
with infantry officers in the Netherlands in order to illustrate the comparable 
dynamics in the military practice.
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Military Practice: Domestic
Although soldiers are best known for the role they play in military conflicts, 
they spend most of their time in peacetime, domestic settings—the nature of any 
military task being fundamentally different to the situation “at home” (Posen, 
2016). The priority in domestic operational military units is to be well-trained 
and prepared in case the need arises for the battalion to be sent on a mission. 
Hence, much energy is invested in getting soldiers to the required level of 
proficiency. An important aspect of the domestic situation is therefore the pre-
deployment phase. 
 This study draws upon the experiences of one platoon, preparing to go on 
a mission to Afghanistan. The platoon’s assignment will be to safely transport 
political advisors from their compound to other locations within the country. 
When a platoon is tasked to go on a mission, they need to do additional, mission-
specific training. For some individuals this means obtaining a specific driving 
licence for a vehicle that is used at the designated location, for others it means 
learning how to use different kinds of weaponry, whilst a third might need to 
update his technical knowledge. Hence, most platoon members follow training 
courses spread across various locations and time periods. Furthermore, they all 
need to have their dental controls and vaccinations in order, which also need to 
be fitted in at different moments in time because of the various training courses. 
Finally, most commanders want to give soldiers the opportunity to spend 
some time with their families and friends before they leave. In view of these 
multifarious demands on their schedules, little time is left to prepare for their 
actual mission—in practice, only a couple of days. I was invited to accompany 
them to one of their training locations. A former camping site was militarised, 
and empty holiday houses functioned as an Afghan village. Here they practiced 
how to get those under their protection in and out of the military vehicles, how 
to safety-check a location, and how to drive from A to B. “As they will drive 
the same roads for four months, the platoon is trained to stay alert when things 
become repetitive. This training is to prepare them” (Lieutenant, field notes, 
October 15, 2014). 
 Besides pre-deployment training, there are the regular activities. Most trainee 
officers believe that most of their time will be spent literally “in the woods”, 
enduring mental and physical hardship, and always being ready to fight an 
enemy. In reality, however, these so-called “green moments” are scarce. The 
reality for junior officers is often different, including a significant amount of 
administration: “There is always someone sick, becoming a parent, off for study 
leave, or a planning needs to be made. Running around in the wood is no daily 
business at all” (Infantry Officer, personal communication, January 7, 2015). 
This difference between the ideal of spending time with their men in the woods, 
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and the daily reality of spending time behind their desks, is just one example of 
the two faces of military reality. 
 In order to support its officers with their planning, the Dutch military makes 
use of an integrated information system. However, most operational officers are 
not very enthusiastic about these information systems and planning tools. They 
are considered a lot of work and, according to one battalion commander, take up 
too much of their time: “There are too many rules, and the young lieutenants stick 
to them fiercely. They put rules above the privates. While you should actually 
be able to understand the privates’ position” (Lieutenant Colonel, personal 
communication, August 10, 2015). A colonel describes how he sees the work of 
junior officers: 
The “regulatory frenzy” does not give them [junior officers] any exit option. You 
have to lie to comply with all the rules, rules that you can never comply with. For 
example, the number of obliged trainings simply does not fit in a year. You might 
be able to achieve the desired level [of professionalism of your platoon], and if 
you have managed that, you just tick some boxes, and make sure you are covered 
on paper. (Colonel, personal communication, August 18, 2015)
These officers reveal a “sore point” of military practice, namely, that for those 
working in such a bureaucratic environment, there is a real risk of failing to 
connect, either to the people, or to the environment around them, becoming 
fixated on compliance with the rules instead.
Military Practice: Expeditionary
In order to learn about the expeditionary environment, in January 2016, I visited 
the Dutch part of a military base in Afghanistan. For Dutch troops in Afghanistan, 
2016 was considered relatively calm, compared to 2007–2008, when troops often 
experienced combat. When I arrived, soldiers complained that they had nothing 
to do, and that they were bored of playing poker and going to the gym. The 
following excerpt describes my first hours spent in the camp: 
The container is locked. Whilst waiting for someone to open it, comments are 
made about the lack of “bitterballen”, a typical Dutch fried snack. It is 7AM 
and I just got off the plane that took me to Afghanistan. The last thing I would 
want right now is a fried snack. It is also the last topic I expected to discuss in a 
country where “we” are fighting a war. Interestingly enough, it is not a joke—it 
is a serious complaint. I am told they are “the forgotten mission”, [and] they have 
to ration these products, whilst in Mali, there is plenty of everything. Inside the 
container there are small offices on both sides, and one briefing room. This will 
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become my office, but right now I am given a safety briefing, and several maps 
and instructions on what to do in case of an attack are handed to me. Things that 
seem rather arbitrary to me are explained in great detail, and supported by an 
extremely well-structured PowerPoint presentation. What I actually need to do, 
or where to go “when the shit hits the fan”, is quickly summed up afterwards. For 
now, I decide to trust in the assessment that this place is rather safe right now. 
(field notes, January 2016, Afghanistan)
What I observed here was that, in the face of actual uncertainty, procedures were 
relied upon to “take care of it”. Whereas, when things of less importance (for 
example, fried snacks) were concerned, there was plenty of time for discussion. 
In a way, this can be interpreted as a strategy by which to ignore uncertainty, 
covering it up with procedures. Another remarkable observation was that the 
majority of the roughly 60 Dutch personnel working at the military base never 
left the compound:
“Camp tigers”, they are called by the ones who do leave. They have breakfast at 
07:15, lunch at 12:00, and dinner at 17:30, every day at the same long table, in 
the same dining hall, where other nationalities (Germans, Croats and Americans) 
all have their own undesignated, but apparently agreed upon, tables. Television 
screens on the wall. Jokes about the lousy food. The same type of jokes that are 
made in the Netherlands. The dining hall, like the rest of the compound, is run 
by Germans, whilst the food is prepared by—mostly—Sri Lankan civilians. I am 
told that if they work here for a couple of years, they get German citizenship. This 
might indicate that this is theoretically not even Afghanistan. The camp tigers can, 
in their spare time, go to the German or American gym, to a pizza place, a coffee 
corner, or one of the two shops; one for cigarettes and chocolate, the other one 
for fancy military gear. In the evenings they sit with their laptops in their bunk 
beds or drink a malt beer or a soda in the “Lion’s Rock”—the Dutch bar—where 
they can also play some pool, table tennis, darts, or poker. The next morning, 
they collectively drink coffee, watch yesterday’s news and get their morning 
briefing. I attend once and learn that one important message is to ration plastic 
cups, because, like the snacks, these cups always get delivered late and less are 
delivered than the number ordered. (field notes, January 2016, Afghanistan) 
The discrepancy between the detailed PowerPoint presentation and the rather 
loose verbal instructions in case of an emergency was not only slightly worrying; 
it also summed up my observation of the two realities of military practice. The 
discrepancy between seemingly banal topics such as snacks, the rationing of 
plastic cups, and the daily routines on the one hand, and their professional 
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presence in supposedly one of the most dangerous areas in the world on the 
other, was striking. Contradictions such as these seemed an inherent part of 
military practice on this mission. A major is rather pessimistic: 
What we do is to send out a lieutenant with maybe 70 people to the sandbox  
[i.e. Afghanistan]. There he should talk to civil representatives and village elders, 
and then he is expected to “act in a stabilising manner”, all on his own… He is 
maybe 23, 24 years old. (Major, field notes, February, 2017)
This statement suggests the impossibility of the assignment: a young commander 
is supposed to “stabilise” a warzone, with barely sufficient experience or people. 
Discussion: Organising Uncertainty
The observations and interview data illustrate how infantry personnel in the Dutch 
military experience a contradiction between uncertainty and standardisation. The 
above also demonstrates that both the domestic and the expeditionary military 
environments have (at least) two faces that are not necessarily compatible. From 
an ethnographic point of view, it is interesting to note that the rhetoric of the 
military and its personnel focuses on the complexity of military work and the 
importance of flexibility under unknown circumstances, whilst their daily lives 
are mainly focussed on processes of standardisation. 
 The existence of processes of standardisation in combination with an uncertain 
environment does not in itself present an untenable situation. And, surely there 
are plenty of (military) skills and drills that prove useful, even (or perhaps 
especially) when the world is uncertain. However, as Weick and Sutcliffe (2007, 
p. 41) argue, when an organisation is designed on the premise that the whole 
world can be captured using clear-cut processes, the focus on standardisation 
is the very thing that makes it difficult to deal with uncertainty. This triggers 
an existential question for the military, namely: How can an organisation that 
is explicitly destined to have an impact on unstable environments be designed 
according to principles that “belong” to stable situations? Obviously, it is not 
possible to run an organisation of this size without any form of standardisation 
and procedures, however, the question is whether the level at which things are 
organised offers enough space for manoeuvre in uncertain circumstances. 
 Looking at the military organisation through the lens of the earlier introduced 
conceptual framework, the military organisation seems organised in a classic way, 
whilst acting in an environment that is highly uncertain. The problem here is, as 
Weick and Sutcliff (2007) argue, that “unexpected events can get them [classic 
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organisations] into trouble” (p. 41). Because of the organisational design, there 
is the risk of focusing mostly on internal processes. “The assumptions, which 
are embedded in its routines, rules, norms, training and roles, establish orderly 
guidelines for performance and interpretation” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 41). 
However, if an organisation believes that all systems are in place in order to 
produce the “right” or expected outcomes, it ceases to reflect critically on its own 
systems. “When people form expectations, they assume that certain sequences of 
actions are likely to happen” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 41). Hence, a pertinent 
risk of this type of organisation is not so much that people have “unlearned” their 
ability to deal with uncertainty, but rather that standardisation becomes a goal in 
itself. 
 Comparable dynamics can be found in other sectors that deal with high levels 
of uncertainty, in combination with possible losses of life, for example health 
care, where there is a tendency “to give greater emphasis to the actual process 
of doing their work than to the results of that process” (Bucher & Stelling, 1977, 
p. 283). Such organisations run the risk of becoming completely geared towards 
their own internal processes, whilst failing to adapt to whatever is happening 
in their environment. Instead of dealing with uncertainty, uncertainty is thus 
ignored. This resonates with Mary Uhl-Bien’s (2007) work on complexity 
leadership theory, which argues that the challenges that organisations face in 
a “fast-paced, volatile context” (p. 299) requires complexity in both leadership 
and organisation. Hence, what happens in the military is similar to developments 
in organisational theory. Moreover, Weick (2015) argues that “reliable 
organisations” need to learn how to “grasp ambiguity” (p. 122–123), in order to 
deal with complex environments.  
Conclusion 
Based on extensive fieldwork in the Dutch military, analysed in the context 
of theories on dealing with uncertainty, this article investigated how the 
contradiction between standardisation and uncertainty is manifested in the 
Dutch military and assessed the consequences for military education. This article 
aimed to illustrate how Dutch military personnel experience this contradiction. It 
established the idea that military practice has at least two sides—one of control 
and standardisation, and one of complexity and uncertainty. In the analysis, it was 
argued that this contradiction is not necessarily incompatible, because military 
mechanisms will work to a certain extent to deal with uncertainty. However, 
there are some risks to this type of classic organisational design. 
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 Whilst the complexities of military operations are widely acknowledged 
and might even be considered to have become largely taken for granted, 
simultaneously, the bureaucratic nature of the military is equally well-known 
and widely observed. Obviously, it is not possible to run an organisation of 
this size without any form of standardisation and procedures. However, the 
question is whether the degree to which things are organised offers enough 
space for manoeuvre in uncertain circumstances. A pertinent risk of this type 
of organisation is not so much that people have “unlearned” their ability to deal 
with uncertainty, but rather that it will become more difficult to respond flexibly 
to uncertainty. Thus, when it comes down to the external environment of the 
military, especially in its expeditionary work, the question remains if such an 
inward-oriented organisation is prepared for the uncertainty, unknowns, and 
complexities that are characteristic for their field of operation. Considering that 
one of the main ambitions of a military organisation is to have an impact on the 
world (fight a war, build peace, disarm conflicts and promote political stability) 
in highly uncertain environments, it is very unlikely that their ambitions will be 
achieved by continuing to focus on internal standardisation. 
Suggestions for further research
Based on this conclusion, it is suggested that these multiple military realities 
should be acknowledged in both the professional and the educational realms. In 
the professional realm, the possibility to question how to organise oneself most 
effectively in an insecure environment should be kept open. At a professional 
level, military organisations operating in insecure environments need a certain 
level of “open design” in order to be able to have an impact on the external 
environments in which they operate. However, a risk for “open designed” 
organisations is that they become a slave to their environments, as they are 
constantly adapting themselves to their surroundings. As a result, they might 
experience difficulties steering their own path, as their actions become mostly 
reactive. Hence, a legitimate question is when to adapt, and when to stay put. 
This question invites further research into flexible responses to uncertain 
environments.
 With regard to military education, another important discussion arises: 
cadets are destined to perform professionally in light of future challenges, but 
are educated according to a predominantly mechanistic worldview. Whilst this 
mechanistic way of organising might be current practice, this article questions 
whether this should indeed be the norm. It is suggested that military education 
should offer more than simply allowing personnel to deal with the discrepancy 
on their own. The current situation seems to be to deny the challenge of 
preparing cadets for the multiple realities of the military domain—complexity 
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and uncertainty on the one hand, and well-ordered professionalism on the other. 
Thus, the question is how the existence of multiple military realities and daily 
discrepancies can be acknowledged in military education and practice.   
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Central Question
This dissertation, its findings and its conclusions, are based on a research project 
that was conducted within the Dutch military. The project ran for four years, 18 
months of which were spent at the Royal Netherlands Defence Academy with 
two groups of infantry cadets, with a further two weeks spent on deployment in 
Afghanistan with a reconnaissance platoon. With this dissertation, my aim was to 
understand what the process of character education entails at the Royal Netherlands 
Military Academy—whether this intended character education is actually realised 
and, if not, what the consequences are within the professional military domain. 
Based on earlier research, internal reports detailing incidents in military education, 
and a general feeling of unease about the formative power of military education 
(see introduction), the following three-layered central research question was 
formulated: 
What is the ambition of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy with regard 
to character education; is this formative goal actually achieved or is there a 
difference between ambition and practice; and, if there is a difference between 
ambition and practice, what are the implications for the military professional 
domain?  
An underlying assumption in this central question is the existence of a difference 
between the ambition and practice of character education. Hence, in order to 
answer this question, a research perspective was developed with a focus on 
discrepancies between the educational philosophy, the institutional rhetoric 
and daily practices. These discrepancies were examined in each of the separate 
studies. 
 Additionally, the four studies marked three phases of a grounded theory study: 
exploration (study 1), specification (study 2 and 3), and reduction (study 4). 
Grounded theory aims to stay close to the original data, and as such to develop 
theory from observations. In the fourth phase (integration), theory development 
takes place. Thus, in conclusion a new theory on military education should be 
presented —based on the original empirical data. However, due to the relatively 
limited scope of the previously described studies, this research cannot pretend to 
offer a fully integrated theory on character education in the military. What it can 
offer is a pathway towards such a theory. This study has identified certain causal 
mechanisms in military education, upon which other researchers can build. 
However, before discussing this in greater detail, the following section first 
summarises the findings of each study, and shows how their results contribute to 
understanding the discrepancies present in military education. 
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Summary of Findings 
Study 1: Educational Philosophy versus Institutional Rhetoric
Examining the alleged discrepancy between the ambition and practice of 
character education within a military context, the first study centred around 
the following question: What are the philosophical underpinnings of character 
education, and how does this relate to military education? The study explored the 
terminology and meaning of the process of character education, its philosophical 
underpinnings, and how they relate to the ambitions of military academies with 
regard to character education. In conclusion, it showed the inherent (theoretical) 
difficulties that accompany the ambition to develop leaders of character. 
 Most importantly, it identified four preconditions for character education and 
contrasted them with the demands of military education. The first precondition, 
namely recognising the insufficiency of rule-based education, states that simply 
teaching rules alone does not achieve character education, which is in strong 
opposition to classical military education, given its emphasis on hierarchy, rules, 
regulations and a highly disciplined (and disciplining) learning environment. 
It is the underlying causal mechanisms, rather than the rules themselves, that 
are formative. The second precondition is to develop rational habituation—that 
is, to combine habituation (such as learning drills) with rationality (reflection). 
Although military education is characterised by habituation, it misses the point of 
training a rational habit in the Aristotelean sense, because it lacks opportunities 
for deeper reflection. Moreover, moral training at military academies is often 
compressed into a small number of lessons with precisely defined learning 
goals that by their very nature limit any chance to explore wider moral issues 
or narratives. The third precondition, formulated as understanding Bildung as 
“building on”, refers to the necessity to build on existing (practical) knowledge. 
Character education in essence is a slow, risky, and open-ended process. Not only 
does the timeframe differ from contemporary military education, so does the 
emphasis shown towards building on existing character. It was shown that most 
military education functions on the principle of unlearning previous behaviour 
and replacing it with military behaviour and skills. The fourth precondition is 
to acknowledge the paradox of character education. In virtue ethics, Bildung, 
and contemporary educational theory, the practice of self-development cannot be 
separated from the social and political (and often normative) environment in which 
self-development takes place. In fact, individual self-development and communal 
development are intertwined, and any attempt to separate the two spheres runs the 
risk of creating a standardised and ineffective learning environment that, whilst 
producing extrinsically motivated individuals with a strong focus on the military 
context, loses sight of the broader social and political context.
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 These preconditions show a clear discrepancy between the educational 
ambitions of military academies and the philosophical foundations of character 
education. It is important to realise that such preconditions are established as 
a result of a constant deliberation of options: What should aspirant officers 
know? What do they want to know? What should they become, and what do 
they want to become? It is precisely these deliberations that should lie at the 
heart of character education. By answering these questions for students—for 
example, by imposing more rules and regulations—and not letting them answer 
these questions themselves, an educational institute loses the opportunity for 
students to develop intrinsic morally responsible behaviour. 
 The preconditions of the first study show the inherent difficulties that come 
with the ambition of the military academies to develop leaders of character. 
What stands out in the analysis of this study is the discrepancy between the 
philosophical foundations of character education, and the way in which character 
education is translated into learning programmes at military academies. This 
study identified several discrepancies, inherent to the ambition of military 
education. The ideals to which military academies aspire cannot be realised in 
the way they currently attempt to fulfil their wider goals and ambitions. In other 
words, these preconditions point to a discrepancy between the espoused theory 
of military academies and the theory in use.
Study 2: Institutional Rhetoric versus Daily Practices
With the intention to “open the black box” (Latour, 2005) of military education, 
the second study examined a range of narratives, revealing insights regarding 
the practice of military education at the NLDA. It centred around the following 
question: How do institutional structures and practices of the Royal Netherlands 
Military Academy shape the daily experiences of infantry cadets? Via an 
institutional ethnography, the study illustrated how cadets themselves experience 
the process of character education. In doing so, this study reflected on the 
dynamics between the institutional characteristics and the experience of the 
population. In this study, two remarkable paradoxes were identified that can be 
considered exemplary for the learning environment at the NLDA. 
 The first paradox, perfect imperfection, refers to the way in which cadets 
believe in the perfection of the military organisation, whilst simultaneously 
experiencing daily feelings of frustration, demotivation and disappointment. The 
other paradox, the individual in the system, resides in the contradiction between 
individual objectives and the requirements of the institute. In order to become a 
competent military leader, cadets were told to focus on their individual leadership 
qualities and autonomy, whilst simultaneously being told to fit into the group and 
the hierarchical system, and to be obedient. The paradox lies in how all of these 
Conclusion
127
conflicting elements are considered essential to the military organisation. 
 The discrepancy between the institutional rhetoric and daily experiences of the 
cadets could hardly be more evident than as seen through gaining an understanding 
of the implications of these paradoxes. As a result, cadets quickly learn to 
navigate the “underlife” (Goffman, 1961, p. 180) of the institute by carefully 
avoiding confrontation with the official structures. Finally, it was suggested that 
the institutional mechanisms of the RNMLA and the effects of military character 
education are more powerful—albeit not always in a positive way—than the 
expectations and planning of the academy, thus effecting the character development 
of the cadets, sometimes in unintended ways. This form of secondary adaptation 
can be risky, as it is neither coordinated nor agreed upon in terms of the educational 
policy of the RNLMA. In terms of the research perspective, the second study is a 
detailed empirical illustration of the theoretical investigation of the first study. Both 
the philosophical investigation (study 1) and the ethnography (study 2) confirmed 
the existence of discrepancies with regard to character education at the RNLMA.
Study 3: Daily Practices in the Military Professional Domain
When I shared the results of the second study with the people I had interviewed, 
one instructor commented: “I do recognise the discrepancies in military 
education, but what you fail to mention is where and how they are present in 
the professional military domain” (captain, personal communication, 2018). He 
was, of course, correct; it is almost impossible to evaluate educational institutes 
without knowledge of the professional domains to which they ultimately lead. 
Responding, I reassured him that the third study was designed to understand 
whether the dynamics in military education could also be “discovered” (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967) in the professional military domain. However, as I also explained 
in the article itself, the nature of the case study changed whilst I was researching 
the platoon concerned. 
 The third study portrayed a reconnaissance platoon deployed in Afghanistan 
between 2015 and 2016. Significantly, during the deployment, the platoon 
commander’s leadership was no longer accepted by the platoon, and he was 
replaced halfway through the mission. The rejection of his leadership became 
the starting point for this study, which focused on the question: How can we 
understand military leadership acceptance in an operational setting from a social 
identity perspective? 
 I decided to analyse the case from the perspective of social identity because 
this perspective helped me to gain an understanding of the conditions necessary 
for the acceptance of military leadership. The rationale behind this choice is the 
critical importance of the relationship between followers and leaders within the 
military organisation. Furthermore, this framework shed light on the importance 
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of contextual factors regarding the acceptance of military leadership. Last, but 
not least, it revealed a discrepancy between what was expected of the platoon 
commander by his superiors, and how he was assessed by those he led in the 
platoon. In conclusion, the case study underscores the importance of contextual 
factors to successful military leadership. Additionally, it shows that leadership 
acceptance is rather more dependent on group processes than it is on individual 
leadership characteristics.
 In terms of the research perspective, the third study illustrated the discrepancy 
between what the military organisation claims to be good leadership (via 
institutional rhetoric on personal leadership qualities) and what happens on a daily 
basis—namely that followers or platoon members decide what good leadership 
is, rather than simply being passive actors in the military hierarchy. As such, 
the results of this case study suggest that the ambition of military academies to 
“mould” a military leader are not realised in the espoused way, not least because, 
as we have seen in study 1, such an ambition stands in fundamental opposition to 
the nature of character education as such.
Study 4: Discrepancy between Complexity and Standardisation
From an ethnographic standpoint, it is interesting to note that for most servicemen, 
daily life is focussed mainly on processes of standardisation, whilst the rhetoric 
of the military more generally and its personnel in particular focuses on the 
complexity of military work and the importance of flexibility under unknown 
circumstances. Zooming in on this tension, the fourth study focused on one 
particular discrepancy, namely the discrepancy between the rhetoric of complexity 
and the practice of standardisation. The central question here was: How can we 
understand the ongoing tension between uncertainty and standardisation that 
appears in military education as well as in military practice? 
 Whilst the complexities of military operations are widely acknowledged and 
might even be considered to have become largely taken for granted, simultaneously, 
the bureaucratic nature of the military is equally well known and widely observed, 
and perhaps equally taken for granted. Obviously, it is not possible to run an 
organisation of this size without any form of standardisation and procedure, 
however, the question is whether the level at which such things are organised 
offers enough space for manoeuvre, especially in uncertain circumstances. A 
pertinent risk of such an organisation is not so much that people cannot deal 
with uncertainty, but rather that standardisation has become a goal in itself. If 
standardisation becomes the goal, this triggers an existential question for the 
military, namely: How can an organisation, the existence of which is predicated 
on its capability to impact unstable environments, be designed according to 
principles of standardisation that belong to stable and secure environments?
Conclusion
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 In conclusion, the fourth study suggests that the multiple realities from the 
military professional domain should be acknowledged in the professional realm, 
as well as in the educational domain. This study invites us to rethink the practice 
of military education. It suggests that military education should offer more than 
simply letting cadets deal with the discrepancy on their own. The current state of 
affairs seems to deny the challenge of preparing cadets for the multiple realities 
of the military domain, with complexity and uncertainty on the one hand, and 
well-ordered professionalism on the other. The question is how the existence 
of multiple military realities and daily discrepancies can be acknowledged in 
military education. 
Integration
The previous section showed how across four studies, different discrepancies, 
paradoxes and unintended consequences in both military character education and 
the military professional domain were identified. The aim of this section is to 
integrate the findings and answer the three-layered central question:
What is the ambition of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy with regard 
to character education; is this formative goal actually achieved or is there a 
difference between ambition and practice; and, if there is a difference between 
ambition and practice, what are the implications for the military professional 
domain?  
The first part of this question—What is the ambition of the Royal Netherlands 
Military Academy with regard to character education?—was mostly answered in 
the first study, which not only revealed the ambition of military academies—to 
develop leaders of character—but also explored the theoretical difficulties that 
accompany this ambition.
 The second part—Is this formative goal actually achieved or is there a 
difference between ambition and practice?—was addressed via a combination of 
studies 1 and 2. On the basis of the findings of the two studies, it can be concluded 
that there are indeed discrepancies between the (philosophical) ambitions of the 
NLDA, the doctrines on character education they employ, and the way in which 
character education itself is experienced. The philosophical underpinnings 
of character education merely form the basis for a rhetoric about such an 
education, but the institute fails to translate this rhetoric into actual educational 
programmes. In other words, ambitions risk becoming merely rhetorical if 
they stand in stark contrast with everyday experienced reality. Additionally, in 
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the practice of character education, cadets experience a paradoxical learning 
environment that in reality bears a close resemblance to the discrepancy between 
philosophical character education and institutional rhetoric. It seems as if the 
theoretical discrepancies that were identified in the first study also surface at the 
RNLMA, in the form of a paradoxical learning environment that also resonates 
in the professional military domain. Take for example the paradoxical lesson “be 
authentic and do what I say” in the second study. This paradox reflects precisely 
the tension of the first precondition “to recognise the insufficiency of rule-based 
education”. 
 The third part of the central question reads: If there is a difference between 
ambition and practice, what are the implications for the military professional 
domain? In this dissertation, military education was analysed from a perspective 
focused upon discrepancies. Based on the results of the four studies and the 
applied methodology, it can be argued that the identified discrepancies reflect 
fundamental incompatibilities between ambition and practice. In terms of 
informed grounded theory, the discrepancies between the institutional rhetoric 
and daily practice are the causal mechanisms in military education. Indeed, one 
might even suggest that the most important challenge for cadets and servicemen 
is to learn how to deal with the discrepancies between the ambition of the 
institute, its institutional rhetoric, and their daily experiences. If they fail to learn 
how to navigate these discrepancies, it is quite likely they will also fail in their 
role as an officer. As a result, cadets learn to behave in certain ways that are not 
necessarily compatible with the ideals of character education, nor with those of 
the institute. It is those cadets who do learn how to navigate this paradoxical 
educational environment that will become military leaders in the professional 
organisation. This begs the question to what extent “navigating the educational 
environment” and malformation are related. 
 The third and fourth study further add to the realisation that the military 
professional domain is more complex than the “perfect” images—the prevalent 
myths about military practice—that cadets have in mind when entering 
the academy (see, for example, the paradox of perfect imperfection in study 
2). This double bind existed in Afghanistan as well. Take for example the 
platoon commander in the third study; the expectations placed upon him by 
the organisation were—given the situation—practically impossible. From an 
organisational perspective, the young leader was supposed to act as a “leader 
of character” and follow the rules of the organisation. However, from both a 
follower’s perspective and from a social identity perspective, it made more 
sense to act as “one of them,” and show “ingroup entrepreneurship”, even if this 
sometimes required him to stand up against the organisation. This contradiction, 
given the contextual circumstances of their mission, exposed the leader to the 
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eventual risk of not being accepted at all—neither by the organisation, nor his 
platoon. 
 Clearly, the preconditions of character education exist in a tense relationship 
with underlying military culture. In order to effect change, perhaps a start would 
be firstly to acknowledge that discrepancies exist, and secondly to acknowledge 
that these same discrepancies influence the development of the cadets. 
However, instead of acknowledging the structural mechanisms, the organisation 
perpetuates the paradox by drilling cadets into certain moulds, whilst all the 
time stating this is character education. It appears that the combination of 
the different levels (educational philosophy, institutional rhetoric and daily 
experience), the constructive drafting of these specific parts, “and the manner 
in which they integrate” indeed conceptualise a particular society as a whole 
(Malinowski cited in Morris, [1987] 2003, p. 144). Additionally, this particular 
society is defined by the discrepancies between these levels. Hence, I would 
like to propose the following starting point for a new theory on the mechanisms 
of military education, in which the discrepancies themselves within military 
education constitute the causal mechanisms of military character education. This 
suggestion was substantiated with results of the four studies. In the following 
section, I will reflect on its meaning and implications with a personal story. 
Reflection
What I found most surprising during this research was not the existence of a 
discrepancy between ambition and execution, nor the formative power of the 
RNLMA, nor the ingroup dynamics in Afghanistan. What surprised me most 
was that this analysis was not unfamiliar to most of the service personnel I spoke 
to—from the lower ranks to high-ranking officers. This point is well illustrated 
by a conversation I had with a high-ranking officer at the NLDA in the middle of 
the night whilst waiting next to a canal for all of the new cadets to step into the 
ice-cold water, wade under a bridge crossing the canal, and climb out again. This 
“ceremony” marks the end of their hazing period. 
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I am standing next to the officer who is responsible for all cadet education at the 
RNLMA. He asks me who I am, and why I am there. I explain to him about my 
PhD, and I am subsequently invited to his office for a conversation, in which I 
also get to ask some questions. I ask him: “What is character education?” He 
tells me: It happens all the time, your whole life. Here we use a very narrow 
mould; there is a certain image of “the soldier,” and to that image we add all sort 
of things. At the end of the hazing period, when they all wade through the canal, 
they are happy, whilst I wonder how useful it was: There is not one different than 
the others. Formation happens at the expense of diversity. I wonder whether we 
cannot enlarge the mould. When, later in their careers, it turns out it did not work 
well, they will probably quickly learn how to fit in, or leave the organisation. 
(research notes, November 2015, Breda)
This officer acknowledged the existence of the educational mechanisms revealed 
in this dissertation, yet even in his position, he apparently felt unable to influence 
their structure. Clearly, the preconditions of character education exist in a tense 
relationship with underlying military culture. In order to effect change, perhaps 
a start would be firstly to acknowledge that discrepancies exist, and secondly 
to acknowledge that these same discrepancies influence the development of the 
cadets. The power of these structural factors cannot be underestimated and, as is 
eloquently expressed by a senior marine, it would require an enormous, concerted 
effort to effect change: “military cultures are like great ocean liners or aircraft 
carriers: they require an enormous effort to change direction” (senior marine cited 
in Murray, 1999, p. 28).
 However, instead of acknowledging the structural mechanisms, the organisation 
perpetuates the paradox by drilling cadets into certain moulds, whilst all the time 
stating this is character education. This dynamic creates the risk that character 
education becomes merely empty rhetoric (see also the paradox of perfect 
imperfection in study 2), rather than an educational process. Hence, based on the 
research conducted, it can be concluded that numerous inconsistencies in both 
military education and practice create a constant mismatch between the ideals and 
ambitions of character education and their execution. It is these structures, or causal 
mechanisms—in terms of informed grounded theory—that this dissertation sought 
to identify. The power of these structures cannot be underestimated. Although there 
is no ground for assuming a direct causal relation between military education and 
malformation, the possibility must nonetheless be acknowledged, as the powerful 
structures and causal mechanisms of military education can potentially result in 
unintended negative consequences. Military educational institutes seem, despite 
their best intentions, to run the risk of transforming students into the products of 
an educational factory rather than critically thinking officers. 
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Relevance and Limitations
This dissertation aimed to describe what the process of character education entails 
at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy—whether this intended character 
education is actually realised and, if not, what the consequences are within the 
professional military domain. Insights from this dissertation may be used to 
improve the connection between education and practice, not only in the Dutch 
military, but also quite possibly in other western military academies. Another 
direct takeaway are the results of the case studies. They may be used to better 
prepare platoons and their commanders before deployment; to develop insight 
into group processes and social dynamics; and to take contextual factors more 
into account. Additionally, in the case of junior officers for whom acceptance 
of their leadership is by no means guaranteed, it is hoped that studying a case 
in which leadership was not accepted can act as a helpful instrument—both for 
them and for their platoons. However, the strength of this research lies not only 
in its direct takeaways, but also in how its conclusions were reached. 
 The proposed starting point for further theorisation—namely that the 
discrepancies in military education themselves are the causal mechanisms of 
military character education—was developed through the use of informed 
grounded theory and a research perspective on discrepancies. This perspective 
revealed structural mechanisms, rather than studying institutional intentions or 
individual behaviour separately. It is this systemic way of looking that might help 
to grasp complex systems in their entirety, rather than looking at the individual 
parts of a system.
 However, although this methodological perspective is an interesting asset of the 
dissertation, the methodology of informed grounded theory and the use of single 
case studies, also come with some potential issues regarding generalisation. The 
case studies in this dissertation give an in-depth representation of, respectively, the 
NLDA, and one particular Dutch platoon deployed in Afghanistan. The problem 
with ethnographies and single case studies is that they are necessarily based on 
unique events. Hence, they can never be universally applied. Given this important 
restriction, I still believe that it is possible to make some inferences about the 
structural dynamics at work within military education, and that this dissertation 
has shown some of the pertinent causal mechanisms of military education. 
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Suggestions for Further Research
This dissertation took me to Afghanistan, to barracks across the country, and 
to hazing periods and campsites in and around the military academy in Breda. 
Besides finding some answers to the meaning of character education, I also 
generated new questions that offer interesting directions for further research. 
The first suggestion springs from the question of how educational institutes 
can deal with the identified mechanisms. The second suggestion is related to 
understanding the relation between incidents and structures of military education. 
Accepting the Risk of Education and Do No Harm
The conclusions of this dissertation resonate with an increasingly influential 
perspective in educational philosophy. Studies by, for example, Allan Bloom 
(2008), William Deresiewicz (2014), Martha Nussbaum (2016), Ken Robinson 
(2011) and Mitchell Stevens (2009), argue that, instead of prioritising the 
personal development of students, educational institutes pressure students to live 
up to strictly formulated, measurable, externally imposed norms. Advocates of 
this perspective seek to show that contemporary western educational models are 
founded on neo-liberal, economic thinking, which aims to maximise and quantify 
everything, even a goal as intangible as character education. A recent study by 
Deresiewicz (2014) suggests that top-rated institutes, such as Harvard and Yale, 
have such demanding structures that they train students to show a “façade of 
affable confidence and seamless well-adjustment” (p. 8), whilst having “unlearned 
to think critically and creatively” (p. 205), as they are trained to closely obey 
strictly formulated goals. Others have used even more alarming terminology: 
“It [every educational system] wants to produce a certain kind of human being” 
(Bloom, 2008, p. 26); or education is “an entire way of life organized around the 
production of measurable virtue in children” (Stevens, 2009, p. 15). 
 Military education and its tendency to make everything measurable seems a 
good example of this type of education. Results from this dissertation suggest 
that in addition to explicit norms, there are contradictory, implicit norms. In the 
search for solutions to this dynamic, Gert Biesta (2014) pleads for an acceptance 
of the inherent “risk of education”. He suggests that students should not to be 
“moulded and disciplined” by measurable learning objectives, but rather learn 
in relation to themselves, their teachers, and society (Biesta, 2014, pp. 1–9). 
Accordingly, based on this dissertation, it is suggested that if military academies 
truly wish to achieve their ambition of character education, they might need 
to accept Biesta’s (2014) “beautiful risk of education” and let go of the 
predominantly standardised educational forms to which they currently adhere. 
Further research might focus on the implementation of this suggestion. 
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 To accept the risk of education, however, does not imply one has to accept the 
risk of malformation. Therefore, my second suggestion is to do more research 
into the possibilities of a “do no harm” principle for military educators. The 
idea of a “do no harm” principle stems from the Hippocratic oath taken by 
medical practitioners, and is generally known as one of the earliest expressions 
of medical ethics. The use of this principle, also in international interventions in 
state- and peacebuilding missions, originates from Mary Anderson (1999) and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2010). 
The principle strongly urges donors to look for both intended and unintended 
consequences linked to their interventions. I believe that adopting such a 
principle for military educators could be an important addition to the ambition 
of military academies with regard to character education in order to diminish 
the risk of malformation. However, as was also argued in study 1, oaths and 
promises in themselves do not prevent misbehaviour. Therefore, more research 
should be done on the functioning and effects of such a principle, and under 
which conditions it might present a feasible option for military education. 
Structural Incidents
Related to the above suggestion, yet more fundamental in nature, my final 
suggestion both examines and questions, not only the structures of military 
education, but also its systemic failures. Whereas the introduction to this 
dissertation included the topic of malformation, its conclusions ask whether these 
events are in fact isolated incidents, or rather the outcome of structural processes 
(see e.g. Dekker, 2015). Within the military context, such research could be 
combined with what Philip Zimbardo (2007) refers to as the system approach. 
Zimbardo explains that in this approach, the system is held responsible for the 
outcome of individual behaviour. Hence, removing one actor (a misbehaving 
cadet, soldier or instructor) does not solve the problem. Instead, he argues, as it 
is a systemic problem, one should rethink the overarching structures. 
 Based on the results of this dissertation, there seems to be ground for assuming 
a more structural dynamic. If these incidents prove to be structural, rather than 
isolated incidents, they might be revealed as outcomes of organisational design. 
Substantiating this claim via further studies might help to understand if and how 
incidents in military education, as well as in the professional domain, relate to 
the causal mechanisms of military education.  
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Summary
Military missions are becoming increasingly complex and, as a consequence, 
military servicemen are confronted with difficult (and growing) ethical and 
operational challenges. These challenges place a heavy burden of responsibility 
onto the shoulders of military leaders. At all levels, individual and group 
decisions can have both international political impact, and result in unforeseen 
consequences. Hence, the importance of military leadership can hardly be 
underestimated. If military leaders are to deal with the complexities of warfare 
in the best possible way, military organisations have to take responsibility for the 
education they provide in a similar way. 
 Education for prospective military leaders is mostly organised at military 
academies, which aim to train officers that are able to adapt to the different 
roles that the organisation and operations impose on them, and deal with 
the ambiguities and pressures of modern warfare. At most western military 
academies, officer education consists of three components: military training, 
academic education and character education. This dissertation looks specifically 
at character education.
 An initial analysis of contemporary military character education shows 
that its practice is far from straightforward. Whilst both military training and 
academic education are well established in accredited learning programmes, 
character education remains a rather abstract component. Even the staff of 
military academies themselves sometimes admit that there is “no clearly 
articulated ‘learning model’ or theory for how to develop leaders of character” 
(Ruggero, 2001, p. 3). In addition, the teaching methods of military academies 
remain an ongoing topic of discussion. In recent years, a number of incidents—
varying from (sexual) intimidation to a feeling of unease as a result of peer 
pressure—have been reported. Incidents such as these are not uncommon. In 
the Netherlands, over the last 25 years, several research commissions have 
been tasked with studying the risks of military education. Apparently, there is 
a discrepancy between the ideals of character education, and the practice of 
military education. It is this alleged discrepancy that provides the starting point 
for this research. 
 This dissertation aims to describe what the process of character education 
entails at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy—whether the intended 
education is actually realised and, if not, what the consequences are within the 
professional military domain. This aim has been formulated into a threefold 
research question: 
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What is the ambition of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy with regard 
to character education; is this formative goal actually achieved or is there a 
difference between the ambition and the practice; and if this is not the case, how 
does this resonate in the military professional military domain?  
Through the use of an overarching framework for analysis, these questions 
are answered in four studies. The framework for analysis consists of two 
complementary methods, namely, grounded theory and ethnography. The 
ethnographic component is based on the discrepancy between “what people say” 
and “what people do” (Malinowski, 1922). The rationale behind this suggestion 
is the existence of a discrepancy between the domains of speech and action. 
Malinowski (1922) argued that, in order to arrive at a “constructive drafting” of 
a community, both domains should be taken into consideration (see also Argyris 
and Schön, 1974). For this dissertation, a third domain has been added to the 
framework of analysis, representing a historical-philosophical investigation 
that aims to explain what the original concept of character education actually 
entailed. In other words, based on this ethnographic approach, this dissertation 
studies the discrepancies between what military academies say and do with 
regard to character education, and its philosophical foundations. 
 The second methodological component is grounded theory. Central to this 
methodology is the inductive approach. The ambition of grounded theory studies 
is to develop theoretical concepts, based on empirical findings—hence, it is a 
bottom-up approach. Grounded theory studies usually consist of four phases. 
The four separate studies presented in this dissertation follow the four phases 
of a grounded theory methodology: exploration (study 1); specification (study 2 
and 3); reduction (study 4); and integration (conclusion). 
 The first study aims to provide a philosophical background to the complex 
task of character education, and can be seen as the exploration phase of the 
grounded theory method. It questions whether a discrepancy exists between 
the ambition and the practice of military academies. The question put forward 
is: What are the philosophical underpinnings of character education, and how 
does this relate to military education? This study can be seen as the exploration 
phase of an informed grounded theory approach, as it is an investigation that 
analyses the philosophical foundations of character education and the way in 
which character education is translated into learning programmes at military 
academies. This study is also used in the integration phase (conclusion) to reveal 
the discrepancies between educational philosophy and the institutional rhetoric. 
 The second study aims to specify the meaning of character education at an 
empirical level. Study 2 examines the discrepancy between the institutional 
rhetoric of the NLDA and the daily practices of cadets at the academy. The study 
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takes the form of an institutional ethnography (Smith, 1987; Smith et al., 2006) 
and is centred around the following question: How do the institutional structures 
and practices of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy shape the daily 
experiences of infantry cadets? This study shows that the Defence Academy 
constitutes, in essence, a paradoxical learning environment that influences the 
character development of the cadets—sometimes in unintended ways.
 In the third study, the scope is widened to encompass the professional military 
domain. It analyses this domain by specifically focusing on the daily practices 
of a Dutch reconnaissance platoon deployed in Afghanistan in which leadership 
broke down and thus became subject to question. Set up as a single qualitative case 
study, this study asks: How can we understand military leadership acceptance in 
an operational setting from a social identity perspective? Rather than primarily 
focusing on the behaviour of the leader, this study highlights the perspective of 
followers in the ranks. Aside from its particular focus on leadership acceptance, 
the study also questions whether the discrepancies that were identified previously 
also exist in the professional military domain. In terms of grounded theory, study 
3 aims to specify the military professional domain. This study, building on the 
aforementioned experiences of a Dutch reconnaissance platoon deployed in 
Afghanistan, reflects on the question of whether the dynamics identified earlier—
those that exist within the domain of military education—are also present in an 
operational professional military context. 
 The fourth study zooms in on one particular and typical discrepancy within the 
military organisation, namely, the tension between complexity and standardisation. 
Based on extensive fieldwork and theories dealing with uncertainty, the fourth 
study investigates how the contradiction between standardisation and complexity 
is experienced in the context of the Dutch military. This study asks: How can 
we understand the ongoing tension between complexity and standardisation that 
appears in military education as well as in military practice? The study can be 
seen as an analysis of one of the structural challenges of the military organisation 
as faced by military leaders. Specifically, by questioning the relation between 
military practice and the professional military domain, this study aims to create a 
deeper understanding of the discrepancy between complexity and standardisation. 
Within the phases of grounded theory, this study reduces the findings to a single 
discrepancy. 
 The concluding chapter integrates the four studies in two ways. First, 
it integrates the research perspective on discrepancies within educational 
philosophy, institutional rhetoric and daily practices. In a concluding discussion, 
the findings are related to questions of structural dynamics within military 
character education. In doing so, this dissertation aims to contribute to 
understanding the formative character of military education. Second, it serves 
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as the final phase of a grounded theory study—the integration—developing 
an argument that provides the foundation for a new theory. This foundation 
is developed by answering the central research question. The first part of the 
question—What is the ambition of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy 
with regard to character education?—was mostly answered in the first study, 
which not only revealed the ambition of military academies—namely, to develop 
leaders of character—but also explored the challenges that accompany this 
ambition from a historical-philosophical perspective. The second part of the 
question—Is this formative goal actually achieved or is there a difference between 
ambition and practice?—was addressed via a combination of studies 1 and 2. On 
the basis of the findings of the two studies, it can be concluded that there are 
indeed discrepancies between the (philosophical) ambitions of the RNLMA, the 
doctrines on character education they employ and the way in which character 
education itself is experienced. The philosophical underpinnings of character 
education merely form the basis for a rhetoric about such an education. However, 
the institute fails to translate this rhetoric into actual educational programmes. 
In other words, ambitions risk becoming merely rhetorical if they stand in stark 
contrast to everyday experiences. Additionally, in the practice of character 
education, cadets experience a paradoxical learning environment that in reality 
bears a close resemblance to the discrepancy between philosophical character 
education and institutional rhetoric. It seems as if the theoretical discrepancies 
that were identified in the first study also surface at the RNLMA, in the form of a 
paradoxical learning environment that also resonates in the professional military 
domain. Take for example the paradoxical lesson “be authentic and do what I 
say” in the second study. This paradox reflects precisely the tension of the first 
precondition from the first study—namely, “to recognise the insufficiency of 
rule-based education”. 
 The third part of the central question asks: If there is a difference between 
ambition and practice, how does this resonate in the professional military 
domain? In this dissertation, military education was analysed from a perspective 
focused upon discrepancies. Based on the results of the four studies and the 
applied methodology, it can be argued that the identified discrepancies reflect 
fundamental incompatibilities between ambition and practice. In terms of 
informed grounded theory, the discrepancies between institutional rhetoric and 
daily practice are the causal mechanisms in military education. Indeed, one 
might even suggest that the most important challenge for cadets and servicemen 
is to learn how to deal with the discrepancies between the ambitions of the 
institute, its institutional rhetoric, and their daily experiences. If they fail to learn 
how to navigate these discrepancies, it is likely they will also fail in their role 
as an officer. As a result, cadets learn to behave in certain ways that are not 
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necessarily compatible with the ideals of character education, nor with those 
of the institute. It is those cadets who do learn how to navigate this paradoxical 
educational environment who will ultimately become military leaders in the 
professional organisation. Studies 3 and 4 further add to the realisation that the 
military professional domain is more complex than the “perfect” images—the 
prevalent myths about military practice—that cadets have in mind when entering 
the academy. Clearly, the preconditions of character education exist in a tense 
relationship with military culture.
 Thus, in order to effect change, perhaps a good start would be to first 
acknowledge that discrepancies exist, and then to acknowledge that these same 
discrepancies influence the development of the cadets. However, instead of 
acknowledging the structural mechanisms at work, the organisation perpetuates 
the paradox by drilling cadets into certain moulds, whilst simultaneously stating 
that this is character education. It appears that the combination of the different 
levels (educational philosophy, institutional rhetoric and daily experience), 
the constructive drafting of these specific parts “and the manner in which they 
integrate” indeed conceptualise a particular society as a whole (Malinowski cited 
in Morris, 1987/2003, p. 144). Additionally, this particular society is defined by the 
discrepancies between these levels. 
 In conclusion, it is argued that the preconditions of character education exist 
in a tense relationship with underlying military culture. This dynamic creates the 
risk that character education becomes merely empty rhetoric (see also the paradox 
of perfect imperfection in study 2), rather than an educational process. Based on 
the research conducted, it can be concluded that numerous inconsistencies in both 
military education and practice create a constant mismatch between the ideals 
and ambitions of character education and their execution. It is these structures, or 
causal mechanisms, that this dissertation sought to identify. The power of these 
structures cannot be underestimated. Hence, the following starting point for a 
new theory on the mechanisms of military education is proposed: within military 
education, the discrepancies themselves constitute the causal mechanisms of 
military character education.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Militaire missies zijn toenemend complex. Mensen die in dergelijke situaties 
opereren, krijgen steeds vaker te maken met ingewikkelde operationele en 
ethische vraagstukken. Voor velen van hen is dat is een zware belasting, in het 
bijzonder voor militaire leiders die de verantwoordelijkheid over een eenheid 
hebben. De noodzaak om deze militaire leiders goed op te leiden, wordt breed 
erkend—zowel in de wetenschappelijke literatuur, als in de maatschappij en in 
militaire kringen. Hoe een goede militaire opleiding eruit zou moeten zien, is 
echter niet eenduidig. 
 Over het algemeen worden toekomstig militaire leiders opgeleid aan militaire 
academies. Binnen de meeste westerse militaire academies bestaat deze opleiding 
uit drie componenten: militaire training, academische educatie en vorming. Met 
name de invulling van de component vorming is een grijs gebied. De afgelopen 
jaren zijn verschillende militaire opleidingen in Nederland in opspraak geraakt. 
De onderwijsmethoden zouden grensoverschrijdend gedrag in de hand werken 
en werden gerelateerd aan fysieke en mentale mishandeling. Het is expliciet niet 
mijn bedoeling om hier met dit onderzoek een oordeel over te vellen. Wel tracht 
ik inzicht te verkrijgen in de mechanismen van militaire educatie. 
 Dit proefschrift gaat over militaire educatie, over de ambitie van militaire 
academies met betrekking tot vorming en over de relatie tussen vorming en de 
militaire praktijk. In het bijzonder heeft dit proefschrift betrekking op de opleiding 
van infanterie officieren aan de Nederlandse Defensie Academie (NLDA) 
in Breda. Een aanvullende casestudy naar de ervaringen van een Nederlands 
peloton dat werd uitgezonden naar Afghanistan en daar het leiderschap van hun 
officier afwees, biedt inzicht in de manier waarop vorming functioneert in de 
professionele militaire praktijk. De rode draad in deze dissertatie is de volgende 
driedelige onderzoeksvraag: 
Wat is de ambitie van de Nederlandse Defensie Academie met betrekking tot 
vorming; in hoeverre wordt dit doel bereikt, of is er een verschil tussen de 
ambitie en de praktijk van vorming; en indien dat verschil bestaat, wat zijn dan de 
implicaties daarvan voor de professionele militaire praktijk? 
Aan de hand van een overkoepelend analysekader worden deze vragen onderzocht 
in vier studies. Het analysekader is gebaseerd op twee complementaire methodes, 
namelijk gefundeerde theorie (grounded theory) en etnografie. De etnografische 
component bouwt voort op het onderscheid tussen “wat mensen zeggen” en “wat 
mensen doen” (Malinowski, 1922). Hij stelde dat je, om een maatschappij echt te 
begrijpen, beide componenten dient te onderzoeken (zie ook Argyris en Schön, 
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1974). De gedachte die hieraan ten grondslag ligt, is dat er een discrepantie 
bestaat tussen de domeinen van zeggen en doen. De claim is dat alleen een 
combinatie van de twee domeinen een “constructieve schets” (Malinowski, 
1922) van een gemeenschap kan geven. Voor dit onderzoek is aan deze denkwijze 
een extra domein toegevoegd waarin een historisch filosofische verkenning 
moet uitwijzen wat het oorspronkelijke idee achter het concept vorming is. 
“Wat mensen zeggen” en “wat mensen doen” met betrekking tot vorming in de 
militaire gemeenschap wordt vervolgens hiertegen afgezet. In andere woorden, 
op basis van dit etnografisch gedachtegoed wordt in deze dissertatie gekeken 
naar discrepanties tussen wat militaire academies zeggen met betrekking tot de 
vorming van militaire leiders, en wat daar filosofisch aan ten grondslag ligt. 
 De tweede gehanteerde onderzoeksmethode is gefundeerde theorie. Centraal 
binnen deze methode is een inductieve werkwijze. De ambitie is om theoretische 
concepten te ontwikkelen op basis van empirisch onderzoek—dat wil zeggen, 
een bottom-up benadering. Studies die zijn gebaseerd op gefundeerde theorie 
bestaan over het algemeen uit vier fases: verkenning, specificatie, reductie en 
integratie. De vier studies waaruit deze dissertatie bestaat, volgen deze fases. 
 Studie 1 is een filosofische verkenning van het concept vorming. De 
onderzoeksvraag luidt: Wat zijn de filosofische grondslagen van vorming en hoe 
verhouden deze zich tot militaire educatie? In studie 2 wordt het concept vorming 
gespecificeerd en empirisch onderzocht in een institutionele etnografie. Deze 
studie beschrijft een 18 maanden durend onderzoek naar de dynamiek tussen 
de Nederlandse Defensie Academie (het instituut) en de dagelijkse ervaringen 
van 23 mannelijke infanteriecadetten. In deze studie wordt onderzocht hoe 
institutionele structuren de dagelijkse ervaring van infanteriecadetten bepalen. 
Studie 3 specificeert vorming in de militaire operationele praktijk door in te 
zoomen op de dagelijkse ervaringen van een peloton in Afghanistan. De studie 
is opgezet als een kwalitatieve single casestudy, waarbij de volgende vraag 
centraal staat: Hoe werkt de acceptatie van operationeel militair leiderschap? 
Om dit te begrijpen, wordt gebruikgemaakt van sociale identiteitstheorie. De 
laatste studie reduceert vier jaar empirisch onderzoek tot een fenomeen in het 
bijzonder. Hier wordt dieper ingegaan op de telkens terugkerende discrepantie 
tussen de complexiteit waarin de militaire organisatie opereert enerzijds, en de 
standaardisering van veel militaire werkwijzen anderzijds. De vraag die in dit 
artikel gesteld wordt, is hoe die discrepantie begrepen kan worden, en hoe deze 
zich manifesteert in militaire educatie en de militaire praktijk. De laatste fase 
van deze methode is integratie. Deze fase wordt beschreven in de conclusie.
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 In lijn met de opzet van een gefundeerde theoriebenadering wordt in de 
conclusie ook een aanzet gegeven voor theorieontwikkeling aangaande militaire 
vorming. Tevens wordt de centrale onderzoeksvraag beantwoord. Het eerste 
deel van deze vraag luidt: Wat is de ambitie van de Nederlandse Defensie 
Academie met betrekking tot vorming? Deze vraag wordt voornamelijk in 
studie 1 beantwoord, waarin niet alleen de ambitie van militaire academies 
wordt beschreven, maar ook wordt onderzocht welke uitdagingen hierbij komen 
kijken vanuit een historisch filosofisch perspectief. Het tweede deel van de 
hoofdvraag—In hoeverre wordt dit doel bereikt, of is er een verschil tussen de 
ambitie en de praktijk van vorming?—wordt geadresseerd in studies 1 en 2. De 
resultaten van deze twee studies laten zien dat er inderdaad discrepanties bestaan 
tussen de (filosofische) ambities van de NLDA, de doctrines over militaire 
vorming en de manier waarop deze vorming door de cadetten wordt ervaren. De 
filosofische grondslagen van vorming lijken eerder een retorische basis dan een 
educatieve methode. Met andere woorden, het risico bestaat dat de ambities met 
betrekking tot vorming holle retoriek worden wanneer deze in schril contrast 
blijken te staan met de dagelijkse praktijk. Ook laat de tweede studie zien dat 
cadetten te maken krijgen met een paradoxale leeromgeving. Opvallend is dat 
deze leeromgeving sterk bepaald lijkt te worden door de discrepantie tussen de 
filosofische grondslagen van vorming enerzijds, en de institutionele retoriek 
anderzijds.
 Het laatste deel van de onderzoeksvraag luidt: Indien er inderdaad een verschil 
bestaat tussen de ambitie en praktijk van vorming, wat zijn dan de implicaties 
daarvan voor de professionele militaire praktijk? Op basis van de gehanteerde 
onderzoeksmethoden en de resultaten van de vier studies wordt in de conclusie 
beargumenteerd dat er fundamentele incompatibiliteiten bestaan tussen de 
ambitie en de praktijk van militaire vorming. Zowel het militaire onderwijs als 
de praktijk wordt gekenmerkt door paradoxen. Dit wekt de suggestie dat een van 
de belangrijkste vormingselementen ligt in de omgang met, en het zich staande 
houden in, een paradoxale omgeving. Als een militair hier niet voldoende in 
slaagt, is de kans groot dat hij geen succesvolle militaire carrière zal hebben. 
Cadetten leren zich al snel te gedragen op manieren die niet noodzakelijk stroken 
met de filosofische beginselen van vorming, noch met die van het militaire 
instituut, waarbij vorming verwijst naar “goed gedrag” zoals beschreven in 
militaire doctrines en handboeken. Degenen die hierin excelleren, zullen de 
leiders worden binnen de professionele organisatie. Studies 3 en 4 verdiepen deze 
conclusies door te laten zien dat het militaire professionele domein complexer is 
dan de ideaalbeelden en de heroïsche mythes over het militaire leven waarmee 
veel cadetten de militaire academie binnenkomen. 
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 De data in deze dissertatie laten op verschillende manieren zien hoe de 
grondslagen van vorming op gespannen voet staan met de militaire cultuur. De 
mogelijkheid om daarin verandering te brengen, vereist in de eerste plaats een 
erkenning van het bestaan van de genoemde discrepanties. Ten tweede dient de 
invloed die deze discrepanties hebben op de ontwikkeling van de cadetten erkend 
te worden. Echter, in plaats van deze structurele mechanismen te erkennen, 
blijft de NLDA cadetten trainen middels een methode waarin standaardisatie 
en institutionalisering de overhand hebben. Wanneer men dit afzet tegenover de 
filosofische grondslagen van karaktervorming, leidt dit tot de conclusie dat deze 
methode niet langer afdoende is en niet goed aansluit bij de idealen die door 
de NLDA gearticuleerd worden. Door te wijzen op het bestaan en de invloed 
van discrepanties in militaire educatie legt dit onderzoek bepaalde structurele 
mechanismen van militaire educatie bloot. De invloed van deze mechanismen op 
de ontwikkeling van toekomstig militaire leiders kan niet onderschat worden. 
 De dissertatie eindigt met een inhoudelijke en persoonlijke reflectie op de 
onderzoeksresultaten. Het lijkt alsof de combinatie van de drie analyselagen (wat 
men zegt, wat men doet, en wat daar filosofisch aan ten grondslag ligt) inderdaad 
goede handvatten heeft geboden om een schets van deze gemeenschap te maken. 
Deze militaire gemeenschap lijkt zelfs grotendeels gekenmerkt te worden door 
de discrepanties tussen deze analyselagen. Deze dynamiek creëert het risico dat 
karaktervorming een holle retoriek wordt in plaats van een educatief proces. Op 
basis van deze bevindingen wordt een startpunt voor een nieuwe theorie over de 
mechanismen van militaire educatie voorgesteld—namelijk dat binnen militaire 
educatie de discrepanties zelf de vormende mechanismen zijn.
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